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ABSTRACT
Two Essays on Monetary Policy Under the Taylor Rule. (August 2004)
Jeong Eui Suh, B.S., Korea University
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dror Goldberg
Dr. Qi Li
In this dissertation, two questions concerning monetary policy under the Taylor
rule have been addressed. The first question is on, under the Taylor rule, whether
a central bank should be responsible for both bank supervision and monetary policy
or whether the two tasks should be exercised by separate institutions. This is the
main focus of Chapter I. The second question is on whether the Taylor rule plays an
important role in explaining modern business cycles in the United States. The second
question has been covered by Chapter II.
The implications of the first chapter can be summarized as follows: (i) it is
inevitable for the central bank to have a systematic error in conducting monetary
policy when the central bank does not have a bank supervisory role; (ii) without a
bank supervisory role, the effectiveness of monetary policy cannot be guaranteed; (iii)
because of the existence of conflict of interests, giving a bank supervisory role to the
central bank does not guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy, either; (iv) the
way of setting up another government agency, bank regulator, and making the central
bank and the regulator cooperate each other does not guarantee the effectiveness of
monetary policy because, in this way, the systematic error in conducting monetary
policy cannot be eliminated; (v) in the view of social welfare, not in the view of the
effectiveness of monetary policy, it is better for the central bank to keep the whole
iv
responsibility or at least a partial responsibility on bank supervision.
In the second chapter, we examined the effect of a technology shock and a money
shock in the context of an RBC model incorporating the Taylor rule as the Fed’s
monetary policy. One thing significantly different from other researches on this topic
is the way the Taylor rule is introduced in the model. In this chapter, the Taylor rule is
introduced by considering the relationship among the Fisher equation, Euler equation
and the Taylor rule explicitly in the dynamic system of the relevant RBC model. With
this approach, it has been shown that, even in a flexible-price environment, the two
major failures in RBC models with money can be resolved. Under the Taylor rule,
the correlation between output and inflation appears to be positive and the response
of our model economy to a shock is persistent. Furthermore, the possibility of an
existing liquidity effect is found. These results imply that the Taylor rule does play
a key role in explaining business cycles in the United States.
vTo My Mother, Jeong Wook Kwon
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, two questions concerning monetary policy under the Taylor
rule have been addressed. In recent years, it has been widely accepted that the
so-called Taylor rule is a more realistic description of how the Fed policy operates
since the Fed definitely perceives the nominal interest rate as its primary policy
instrument. The first question is on, under the Taylor rule, whether a central bank
should be responsible for both bank supervision and monetary policy or whether the
two tasks should be exercised by separate institutions. This is the main focus of
Chapter I. The second question is on whether the Taylor rule plays an important
role in explaining modern business cycles in the United States. If the answer to this
question is no, then, the Taylor rule is not practically meaningful, i.e., researches
on the first question can not have any significant meaning, either. Hence, these two
questions are closely related to each other. The second question has been covered by
Chapter II.
The first topic has newly attracted increased academic attention. This is because,
generally speaking, there is a trend among central banks to retreat from bank super-
visory functions. As the trend made itself apparent during 1990s, a concern about the
effectiveness of monetary policy naturally followed. The main point is that if a central
bank got rid of the bank supervisory role, it may lose information-related synergies
between bank supervision and monetary policy. However, despite the importance,
this topic has not yet received an extensive treatment in the economic literature,
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Business & Eco-
nomic Statistics.
2with only a few recent papers devoted to the issue. This might result from the fact
that nobody had to worry about the loss of information-related synergies between
bank supervision and monetary policy since bank supervision had been mainly per-
formed by central banks around the world until the late 1990s. Most of the existing
studies have either focused on providing arguments in favor of (or against) one of
the two solutions, or compared the macroeconomic performance of countries where
monetary policy and bank supervision are combined with that of countries where the
two functions are formally separated. No regulatory arrangement has been shown to
be clearly superior. However, some recent developments occurred in many countries
around the globe seem to indicate that the idea of assigning the two functions to
different agencies is becoming more popular in practice.
Among those recent studies on this topic, Peek et al. (1999) showed a very
important implication when evaluating the structure of the central bank. Unlike the
current trend surrounding central banking systems, the authors argued with empirical
evidence that the conduct of monetary policy requires full access to bank supervisory
information. Specifically, if a central bank cannot access to the confidential compo-
nent of the bank supervisory information, there will be a systematic error in making
economic forecasts which is absolutely necessary for monetary policy decision-making.
Direct interpretation of the findings of Peek et al. (1999) suggests there will be a sys-
tematic error in conducting monetary policy if the central bank does not have the
ability to access bank supervisory information or if the central bank does not have
any bank supervisory role. The main purpose of the first chapter is to show a possible
explanation about why there should be a systematic error and how the central bank
will be well served to have a bank supervisory role. With a simple game-theoretic
approach, it is shown that it is inevitable for the central bank to have a systematic
3error in conducting monetary policy when the central bank does not have a bank
supervisory role because commercial banks also profit-maximize just like other firms.
It is also shown that either giving a direct bank supervisory role to the central bank
or setting up a bank regulator separate from the central bank is not good enough
to guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy. Additionally, based on the social
welfare criteria, it will be argued that the central bank should take the whole respon-
sibility or at least a partial responsibility for bank supervision, which goes against
the current trend surrounding central banking systems.
The second topic is related to one of the most popular literature in economics.
Real business cycle (RBC) models have been surprisingly successful at accounting for
several non-monetary features of U.S. business cycles, but they have been less success-
ful once money is involved. The second chapter examines the impact of technology
and money shocks in a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with no
frictions except money under a cash-in-advance constraint and the assumption that
the central bank follows the Taylor rule.
One thing significantly different from other researches on this topic is the way
the Taylor rule is introduced in the model. In this dissertation, the Taylor rule
is introduced by considering the relationship among the Fisher equation, the Euler
equation and the Taylor rule in the dynamic system of the relevant RBC model. This
approach can be justified based on the reason that, if the Fed follows the Taylor rule
strictly, and if we assume that the Fed always achieves its target nominal interest
rate, then, the nominal interest rate is determined prior to the real interest rate.
Without the Taylor rule, the real interest rate is determined by the Euler equation
and the nominal interest rate is subsequently determined by the Fisher equation.
With this approach, it has been shown that, even in a flexible-price environment, the
4two major failures in RBC models with money can be resolved. Under the Taylor
rule, the correlation between output and inflation appears to be positive and the
response of our model economy to a shock is persistent. Furthermore, the possibility
of an existing liquidity effect is found.
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ARE CENTRAL BANKS ALL-MIGHTY?
DO THEY STILL NEED A BANK SUPERVISORY ROLE?
1. Introduction
The question of whether a central bank should be responsible for both bank
supervision and monetary policy or whether the two tasks should be exercised by
separate institutions, has recently received renewed attention. This might be a nat-
ural evolution of academic curiosity in that the debate surrounding central bank
independence has been nearly settled with the conclusion that central bank indepen-
dence is a good thing for sound macroeconomic stability. While the importance of
central bank independence has been attracting a lot of academic attention (see, for
example, Cukierman (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993), Posen (1995), and Fuhrer
(1997)), the bank supervisory role of central bank has not acquired much attention
until recently.
There is another reason, which is much more important, for this topic to have
newly attracted increased academic attention. Although roughly three-quarters of
OECD countries assign their central banks either total or shared responsibility for
bank supervision, many of these countries are reviewing those responsibilities. Gener-
ally speaking, there is a trend among central banks to retreat from bank supervisory
functions. In 1997, a comprehensive institutional reform assigned responsibility for
bank supervision and regulation in the United Kingdom to the Securities and In-
vestment Board, which was reconstituted as the Financial Services Authority (FSA),
a single financial supervisory authority. These functions were previously conducted
6by the Bank of England (see Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999)). In the Euro zone, the
principle of separating monetary policy and bank supervision responsibilities has been
formally established in the statute of the European Central Bank (ECB). It empowers
the ECB to set out and conduct monetary policy in the Euro area, but leaves the
responsibility for bank supervision with the national authorities (see Padoa Schioppa
(1999)). Among the European Union countries, Luxembourg created a single finan-
cial supervisory authority (the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier) in
1998 and entrusted with supervisory responsibilities extending to all financial inter-
mediaries and markets. There are no institutional relationships or formal bilateral
cooperation arrangements in place with the Banque centrale du Luxembourg. In
Germany, Ireland, Finland and Austria, there have been government proposals dur-
ing the period of 1999 to 2001 arguing for the adoption of UK-like arrangements. In
case of Germany, although an extensive cooperation between the new single authority
and the Deutsche Bundesbank was called for in the government proposal, the effects
on the involvement of the latter in bank supervision are still unclear. In the other
European countries, according to those proposals, national central banks will be set
outside of bank supervisory responsibility. In Asia, the Bank of Korea and the Bank
of Japan have lost all kinds of bank supervisory responsibilities to a newly established
financial supervisory authorities in 1998, while they have received enhanced central
bank independence. In the case of Korea, the Bank of Korea kept the whole bank
supervisory responsibilities before the new agency was created. In the case of Japan,
banks treated the ‘suggestions’ of the Bank of Japan as binding regulations although
the bank supervisory responsibility was on the Ministry of Finance before the new
agency was created. In the United States, although the Federal Reserve does not
appear to be going to lose its partial responsibility for bank regulation and supervi-
sion, since 1994 a series of bills before Congress have proposed consolidating all bank
7supervisory responsibilities under a new single federal regulator separate from the
Federal Reserve (see Shull (1993) and Coffee (1995)).
As the trend made itself apparent during 1990s, a concern about the effective-
ness of monetary policy naturally followed. As Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995)
explained, the function of bank supervision had been mainly performed by the central
banks ever since a central banking system was introduced. Until the trend showed
up during the 1990s, nobody seemed to worry about the possibility that the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy may be lowered because of the non-existence of bank
supervisory roles in central banks’ hands. The main point is that if a central bank
got rid of the bank supervisory role, it may lose information-related synergies between
bank supervision and monetary policy. As Peek et al. (1999) argued, there are two
main reasons one might expect bank supervisory information to contribute to effec-
tive monetary policy. First, problems in the banking sector may serve as an early
indicator of deteriorating conditions in the macro-economy generally. Alternatively,
the information could provide advance notice of changes in bank lending behavior,
which would affect the macro-economy to the extent that the lending view is opera-
tive (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995); Hubbard (1995); Kashyap and
Stein (1994a, 1994b); and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993)). There is also another
concern about increased systemic risk on the banking industry after central banks
lost their bank supervisory role. This concern, however, does not seem to attract
much attention because of the expansion of deposit insurance systems across almost
all major countries. In fact, activation of deposit insurance systems across countries
for the purpose of financial system stability has played the main role in motivating
the current trend surrounding central banking systems.
As we will see in the next section, despite the importance, this topic has not yet
8received an extensive treatment in the economic literature, with only a few recent
papers devoted to the issue (see Heller (1991); Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995);
Haubrich (1996); Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999); Peek et al. (1999); Bini Smaghi
and Gros (2000)). This might result from the fact shown above that nobody had to
worry about the loss of information-related synergies between bank supervision and
monetary policy since bank supervision had been mainly performed by central banks
around the world until the late 1990s. Indeed, as Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999)
indicated, a sound theoretical analysis is still on the research agenda. Most of the
existing studies have either focused on providing arguments in favor of (or against)
one of the two solutions, or compared the macroeconomic performance of countries
where monetary policy and bank supervision are combined with that of countries
where the two functions are formally separated. No regulatory arrangement has been
shown to be clearly superior. As we saw earlier in this section, however, some recent
developments occurred in many countries around the globe seem to indicate that the
idea of assigning the two functions to different agencies is becoming more popular in
practice.
Among those recent studies on this topic, Peek et al. (1999) showed a very
important implication when evaluating the structure of the central bank. Unlike the
current trend surrounding central banking systems, the authors argued with empirical
evidence that the conduct of monetary policy requires full access to bank supervisory
information. Furthermore, for the central bank to exploit this important source of
information in the conduct of monetary policy, it must have timely and reliable data.
Specifically, if a central bank cannot access to the confidential component of the bank
supervisory information, there will be a systematic error in making economic forecasts
which is absolutely necessary for monetary policy decision-making. As the authors
9indicated, their paper might be the first serious one, without depending on the lender-
of-last-resort stories, in favor of the view that central banks need a direct role in bank
supervision for effective monetary policy in terms of the information-related synergies
between bank supervision and monetary policy. Since the implication of their paper
plays a key role in this paper, a more detailed content of their paper will be presented
later as part of a literature survey.
Direct interpretation of the findings of Peek et al. (1999) suggests there will be
a systematic error in conducting monetary policy if the central bank does not have
the ability to access bank supervisory information or if the central bank does not
have any bank supervisory role. The main purpose of this paper is to show a possible
explanation about why there should be a systematic error and how the central bank
will be well served to have a bank supervisory role. With a simple game-theoretic
approach, it is shown that it is inevitable for the central bank to have a systematic
error in conducting monetary policy when the central bank does not have a bank
supervisory role because commercial banks also profit-maximize just like other firms.
This is because when an economy has a shock and the shock affects the interest
rate, the reaction of the central bank should affect the profit of commercial banks.
Assuming a situation where the central bank should depend on commercial banks
to get information about real economy status, there is an incentive for commercial
banks to lie to the central bank in order to maximize their profit. Following Poole
(1970), and Caplin and Leahy (1996), it is assumed that policy makers in the central
bank are ignorant of shocks occurring in the real economy. Also, following Barro and
Gordon (1983), it is assumed that central banks following an interest rate rule work
to minimize a given loss function. In the same game-theoretic framework, it is also
shown that either giving a direct bank supervisory role to the central bank or setting
10
up a bank regulator separate from the central bank is not good enough to guarantee
the effectiveness of monetary policy. Additionally, based on the social welfare criteria,
it will be argued that the central bank should take the whole responsibility or at least
a partial responsibility for bank supervision, which goes against the current trend
surrounding central banking systems.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, a literature survey follows.
The survey comprises the traditional economic debate in favor of (or against) com-
bining bank supervision and monetary policy within the central bank, the possible
reasons why we should see the current trend surrounding central banking systems for
now, and the contents of those recent papers in this topic. The third section includes
a game-theoretic approach. It addresses the following questions: Can a central bank
keep the effectiveness of monetary policy when it does not have any bank supervisory
role? How can a bank supervisory role help a central bank improve the effectiveness
of monetary policy? When there is another government agency specializing in bank
supervision, does a central bank still need to have a direct bank supervisory role?
The final section concludes.
2. Literature Survey
2.1. Economic Debate on Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy
As Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) indicated, the issue of whether it is better
to combine or separate the functions of bank supervision and monetary policy was
broadly discussed by the traditional literature on central banking (from Bagehot
(1999) on). However, only recently has a more careful investigation been undertaken.
I will summarize, first, the traditional economic debate on both the advantages and
11
disadvantages of having bank supervision assigned to the monetary policy agency,
based on Jordon (1996), Tuya and Zamalloa (1994), Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(1995), Haubrich (1996), Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999), Bini Smaghi and Gros
(2000), and Lannoo (1999). Next, I will provide some possible reasons for the current
trend surrounding central banking systems.
2.1.1. Traditional Arguments Against Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary
Policy
The major disadvantage in combining monetary policy and bank supervision
responsibilities is based on a potential conflict of interests. This is based on the
possibility that bank supervisory concern about the fragility of the banking system
might lead the central bank to pursue a more accommodating monetary policy than
warranted for the pursuance of price stability. If the central bank is responsible for
bank supervision and is concerned with the stability of financial institutions, it may
be tempted to create central bank liquidity with the view of avoiding a financial
instability which one or more financial institutions in difficulty experiencing losses
could trigger. This situation may occur especially if the underlying macroeconomic
conditions require the central bank to tighten monetary policy, for instance to counter
inflationary pressures.
The second type of problem arises from the fact that negative experiences in
the resolution of banking crises may jeopardize the credibility of the central bank,
even with respect to its monetary policy responsibilities. Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(1995) suggest, for instance, that the credibility of the Bank of England has been
impaired after the BCCI crisis. Market participants may interpret the emergence
of crises as a failure of the supervisory capacity of the central bank. The latter
12
may thus be induced to cover up such a failure through the injection of central
bank liquidity. If market participants anticipate that the central bank with bank
supervisory responsibilities may be more prone to use the monetary lever, the problem
of moral hazard may be exacerbated. Moral hazard may also increase as a result of
the lack of transparency arising from the fact that the central bank has two objectives
which are not clearly distinguished and which may at times conflict.
Finally, a more general point is that the cyclical effects of micro (bank supervi-
sory) and macro (monetary) policy tend to conflict. Monetary policy is supposed to
be counter-cyclical, while the effect of regulation, e.g. capital adequacy requirements,
tends to be pro-cyclical. As an example, consider a period of economic slowdown, in
which the banks’ non-performing assets are likely to increase. The bank supervisor
will require higher provisions for possible loan losses and put pressure on banks to im-
prove the quality of their portfolios. The banks’ implementation of these supervisory
recommendations would hence result in tighter credit in the course of a recession.
Monetary policy should instead be expansionary, and would call for a temporary
reduction in the minimum capital asset ration, so as to provide more funds to the
economy and speed up its recovery. On the other side, a tight monetary policy may
have an undesired impact on bank solvency, as higher interest rates increase the risk
of loan defaults in the banking system.
2.1.2. Traditional Arguments for Combining Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy
The main argument for combining the functions of monetary and supervisory
management within the central bank is linked to the central bank’s concern for the
systemic stability of the financial system. By doing bank supervision, which includes
all on and off-site surveillance of the safety and soundness of individual institutions,
13
the central bank can acquire micro-information. In this sense, the combination is
particularly needed in times of financial crises, when only direct supervision can
deliver the essential information of time. The informal inside information on how
managers react and what strategies they pursue simply cannot be duplicated by
reading reports or consulting with other agencies. Hence, a central bank supervising
the banking system might know more precisely if a bank asking it for credit, in its
role as lender-of-last-resort, is insolvent or just having a minor problem in liquidity. If
the central bank does not have access to micro-information, the lender-of-last-resort
function is difficult to perform and mistakes can easily be made.
Another argument is that the central bank will be able to acquire valuable in-
sights into the overall state of the economy by being involved in the supervision and
regulation of banks and, hence, to get information-related synergies. Combining bank
supervision and monetary policy allows the central bank to consider the broader con-
sequences of supervision. As the Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
said in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 1994:
.... Indeed, a single regulator with a narrow view of safety and sound-
ness and with no responsibility for the macroeconomic implications of its
decisions would inevitably have a long-term bias against risk-taking and
innovation. It receives no plaudits for contributing to economic growth
through facilitating prudent risk-taking, but it is severely criticized for
too many bank failures. The incentives are clear ....
Combining the two functions has also been argued in view of payment system
stability. Payment system is a key channel for the potential spread of contagion
risk. As Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1992) point out, the central banks’ growing
awareness of the liquidity and the credit risks in net and gross (with un-collateralized
overdrafts) settlements systems have initiated several risk reduction policies: the most
14
direct measure used to be, and still is, to control access and monitor the participants
(see Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999)). For the central bank to be able to prevent
the potential spread of contagion, since the central bank should play a key role in
managing the payment system, the central bank has to be able to distinguish risky
banks from solvent banks, which would not be not possible without a bank supervisory
role.
There are also other arguments. Among them, the independence and expertise
argument highlights the quality of the contribution central banks can make to financial
stability. Independence of supervisory authority from political interference is impor-
tant for effective supervision. This is particularly true in some emerging countries,
where so-called policy loans, i.e., loans granted under formal or informal pressure
from governmental authorities, are still a reality. In general, the laws, regulations
or acts of the public administration may interfere with the entrepreneurial choices
of financial intermediaries. In such cases, when the intermediaries get into trouble
because of the wrong incentives they were given, pressure to bail them out might be
very high. Central bank independence might shelter supervision from undue external
interference, as well from the risk of regulatory capture by the supervised entities.
An additional argument for combining monetary policy and bank supervision is that
central banks are generally recognized as sources of excellent research and analysis
on the banking and financial system. They have gained a wealth of knowledge on
the structure and performance of the domestic financial system over time, which is
continually renewed through their active presence in financial markets.
15
2.1.3. Possible Reasons of the Current Trend Surrounding Central Banks
The traditional debate on how to assign two different functions, monetary policy
and bank supervision, has had as long of a history as the central banking system itself.
However, we have never seen such a big change in the structure of central banking
systems, at least as far as the way of the two functions were assigned is concerned,
until the current trend that occurred in the late 1990s. Hence, there should be some
reasons, which were not covered in the traditional debate, and which are motivating
enough for the current trend to occur. In this part, I summarize those possible reasons
for the current trend.
The most notable change surrounding central banks is the expansion of depositor
insurance systems. Although the depositor insurance system has been criticized, espe-
cially in the US due to an increase in moral hazard concerns, deposit insurance systems
have been rapidly expanded in new countries over the last two decades. According
to Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995), among 24 well-developed and mid-developed
countries, only eight countries had established deposit insurance systems before 1980,
while ten countries have established such systems since 1980. Furthermore, all EU
countries were required to introduce a common scheme of minimum insurance levels
for most depositors, beyond which individual member states can extend protection
levels, if they want. This reflects, I believe, the significant contribution of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and subsequent studies, which showed clearly that depositor insur-
ance systems are more effective in preventing banking crises over the central banking
system. This also reflects the reality that as the scale of funding necessary in some
banking crises (e.g. in the USA, Scandinavia, Japan, and Korea) had gone far beyond
the sums which the central bank can provide from its own resources, the rescues have
been increasingly financed by the tax-payer (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995)).
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The expansion of depositor insurance systems around the world must have af-
fected what we think about how to assign the two functions. As it is shown in the
above traditional debate, the central bank’s lender-of-last-resort function for financial
system stability has been the main concern for the proponents arguing that the two
functions should be combined. Although the depositor insurance system has been
well established, the lender-of-last-resort function of the central bank should have
its own usefulness considering the fact that it is the most efficient way to prevent
financial disturbances when some banks have only a problem of liquidity and not a
problem of failure. However, it could be a good reason for legislators to wonder if the
central bank should keep bank supervisory responsibilities in place, given a possible
better system in preventing banking crises.
Another reason is a significant change in the way central banks conduct mon-
etary policy. During 1970s and 1980s, most major central banks, except the Fed,
had depended on monetary targeting policy. Those central banks, however, have
abandoned the monetary targeting policy since it became clear that the stable re-
lationship between aggregate money (e.g. M1 and M2) and real economic variables
(e.g. inflation and GDP) were broken down. After giving up the monetary targeting
policy, those central banks moved to either inflation targeting policy or interest rate
targeting policy. As Goodhart (1999) stated, there was a time when a vocal segment
of the academic community advocated a notably different operating mechanism, of
monetary base control, but that debate has faded. We need to note that, under a
monetary targeting policy regime, there is a necessity that the central bank should
keep a close relationship with commercial banks. This can be clearly shown by the
well-known money multiplier
M = B
[
(C/D) + 1
(C/D) + (R/D)
]
, (2.1)
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where B = C + R, M = C +D, M is money, B is monetary base, C is currency, R
is bank reserves, and D is deposit. What (2.1) implies is that the central bank needs
to keep monitoring bank reserves and deposits, and, thus, to also keep aggregate
money targeted. However, under an inflation targeting policy regime or interest rate
targeting policy regime, the central bank does not need to care about keeping targets
on aggregate money, and, therefore, the central bank does not have to keep a close
relationship with commercial banks. This is so because the central bank just needs
to keep the interest rate as targeted regardless of how the aggregate money demand
changes or the components in money multiplier vary. This argument cannot be an
absolute reason for the central bank to give up the bank supervisory role. It is clear,
however, that at least the change in monetary policy regime lowered the necessity for
the central bank to keep a close relationship with commercial banks.
Here, it is necessary to mention that inflation targeting policy and interest rate
targeting policy are basically the same if we assume that it is the interest rate not
inflation which the central bank can directly control, and that inflation is a function of
the interest rate. Because, under this assumption, both policies are based on interest
rate manipulation. Christiano and Rostagno (2001) make it clear that under a pure
Taylor rule, the central bank chooses aggregate money to achieve the following rate
of interest:
Rt = R˜(
pit+1
pi
)α
p˜i
R˜ , (2.2)
where R˜ = pi
β
− 1, pi ≥ β, α > 0, 1 > β > 0 are all parameters. Under this monetary
policy rule, the supply of money is determined by the market. Note that, considering
the relationship of R˜ = pi
β
− 1, picking up an inflation target directly means picking
an interest rate target. In fact, they refer to pi and R˜ as the inflation rate and the
nominal interest rate under the target inflation steady state.
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The conglomeration of financial services also contributes to the current trend.
The conglomeration argument rests on the evidence that closer linkages are gradu-
ally developing between banks, securities companies, asset managers and insurance
companies, while the traditional distinction between different financial contracts is
blurring, so that different types of intermediaries actually compete in the same mar-
kets. Under these conditions, sectoral supervisors might be less effective in monitoring
overall risk exposures in large and complex financial groups, and differences in sectoral
rules or practices might alter the level playing field between competing intermediaries.
Tools for coordinating the different sectoral authorities, such as committees, memo-
randa of understanding, joint board participation, etc. could alleviate the problem
and have proven successful in many countries.
The conglomeration argument, however, is often related to the goal of achieving
more effective supervisory structures and limiting the burden that regulation im-
poses upon intermediaries. Financial groups with many lines of business would avoid
reporting and paying for the supervision exercised by different authorities, thereby
minimizing the costs of compliance (and, perhaps, of lobbying) and the risks of con-
flicting supervisory assessments. It is not surprising, therefore, that the financial
industry frequently supports reforms introducing a single supervisory agency. For
example, in testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
of the United States Senate, March 9, 1994, Donald Howard, former Citicorp Chief
Financial Officer stated:
.... If the Federal Reserve were removed from the bank regulation process,
would it have any significant impact on its ability to conduct monetary
policy? My answer is: Clearly it would not .... It is clear that the primary
role of the Federal Reserve is the conduct of monetary policy. That role
is so important, I believe carrying out that function should not be diluted
even slightly by having any of its resources diverted to any other function,
including bank regulation. ....
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If supervisory responsibilities over the whole financial sector have to be assigned
to a single authority, the central bank would not be the most obvious candidate. The
central bank traditionally plays a role in bank supervision, i.e., in the monitoring
of counter-parties, who are an essential component in the transmission of monetary
policy. However, their natural jurisdiction seldom encompasses securities firms, and
almost never insurance companies.
There is also a political reason that affected the current trend. The reason is that,
if the central bank keeps the traditional role as a bank supervisory authority as well,
the central bank could have too much power. This argument takes into consideration
the fact that, in almost all major countries, the central bank independence has been
significantly enhanced. Attributing to independent central bank bank regulatory and
supervisory tasks as well, especially if extended to the whole financial sector, might
be considered detrimental to the system of checks and balances on which democracies
rely in order to avoid potential abuse in the performance of public functions.
2.2. Literature Survey
Despite the fact that this debate has a very long history, there has been none
which treated the relationship between monetary policy and bank supervision in a
theoretical framework. There has also been almost nothing which treated the topic
in a serious empirical framework until those recent studies appeared during 1990s.
Generally speaking, except Peek et al. (1999), all studies seem to support the idea
that the two functions of monetary policy and bank supervision should be assigned
to different agencies.
Naturally, the empirical evidence comparing the relative performance of systems
where the central bank exercises supervisory responsibilities with those where a sep-
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arate authority exercises supervision is scarce. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995)
examine the issue from the point of view of the effectiveness of bank supervision in
avoiding banking crises. On the basis of a sample made of 104 banking crises, the
authors conclude that there is no evidence that one system has performed better than
the other.
Concerning the inflation performance of the two systems, Heller (1991) finds that
countries where the central bank is also responsible for bank supervision have recorded
on average a significantly higher rate of inflation. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995)
obtain a similar result. These authors suggest, however, that this result may not
be considered as a proof of a conflict of interest between monetary policy and bank
supervision, but possibly of the fact that central banks with combined responsibilities
are generally less independent. The correlation between the supervisory responsibility
of the central bank and inflation performance would thus be a proxy of the (negative)
relation between central bank independence and inflation.
Bini Smaghi and Gros (2000) examine whether the involvement of the central
bank in supervisory activities has a significant impact on inflation performance, inde-
pendently from the degree of central bank independence. The empirical results show
that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the exercise
of supervisory responsibilities and inflation performance in industrial countries. The
exercise of prudential supervision by the central bank has instead no significant effect
on growth performance or variability.
Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) find that the inflation rate is considerably higher
and more volatile in countries where the central banks acts as a monopolist in bank
supervision than in countries where this responsibility is assigned to another agency
or to more than one agency (including the central bank). They limit their analysis
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to OECD countries, which are divided into two groups, according to whether or not
their central bank acts as a monopolist in bank supervision.
Peek et al. (1999) show that, without using confidential bank supervisory infor-
mation, there should be a systematic economic forecast error, and that the policy-
making body, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) does use the confidential
bank supervisory information in making policy. In fact, they show a very important
implication when evaluating the structure of the central bank. Unlike the current
trend surrounding central banking systems, and the other related studies’ implica-
tions, the authors argued with empirical evidence that the conduct of monetary policy
requires full access to bank supervisory information.
Since the implication of their paper plays a key role in this paper, more detailed
content of their paper will be presented below. First, using panel data estimation, they
tested whether the Greenbook, which is official economic forecast made by the Federal
Reserve staff, reflects bank supervisory information. Specifically, they estimated the
following equation to compare the forecast in the Greenbook and those of other private
economic forecasting agencies:
Xt+i = α0 + α1tX
e
j,t+i + α2Pt + α3GB ∗ Pt + εj,t+i, (2.3)
where j represents the Greenbook and other private economic agencies, i is one-, two-,
three-, and four-quarter-ahead forecasts, Xt+i is the actual value (X) of inflation rate
and unemployment rate in quarter t+ i, tX
e
j,t+i is a forecasted value (X
e) by j for the
quarter t + i as of time t, and Pt is proxy variable for confidential bank supervisory
information, and GB is a (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of one for Greenbook
forecasts. The proxy variable is the percentage of bank assets held by banks with a
supervisory composite CAMEL rating of 5.
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The CAMEL ratings are intended to reflect different degrees of bank health, with
examiners rating each bank according to its Capital, Asset, Management, Earnings,
and Liquidity (CAMEL). The ratings range from 1, indicating no significant examiner
concerns, to a rating of 5, indicating examiners believe that the bank has a high
probability of failure. Because an announcement by a regulator that a bank has a
high probability of failure could be extremely detrimental to the institution, individual
bank CAMEL ratings are highly classified. Another key point of the equation is that
the forecasted value is included as an explanatory variable. In order to interpret this,
we need to see the fact that it should be presumed that the forecasted values must
have been estimated based on all possible information which is helpful in making
economic forecasts. In this sense, tX
e
j,t+i can be also considered as a proxy variable
for all possible information which can explain the actual values.
Note that an interactive term composed of the product of Pt and GB is included
in the equation. The estimated coefficient on this interactive term can be used to
measure the extent to which the Greenbook outlook incorporates the confidential
bank supervisory information differently than do the private forecasts. Also, note
that if the Greenbook forecasts do not differ from private forecasts in the degree to
which the supervisory information is incorporated, α3 in equation (2.3) would not
differ significantly from zero. On the other hand, if the supervisory information is
fully utilized by the Greenbook, the estimated value of α3 would be significant and
equal to −α2.
The estimation results are striking. While α2 is significantly different from zero,
α3 is insignificant for each of the four forecast horizons. This means that the confiden-
tial bank supervisory information does have something to do with actual economic
values, and that economic forecasts made by even Federal Reserve staff do have a
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systematic error because they failed to incorporate the confidential bank supervi-
sory information into economic forecasting. In fact, an increase in the proxy variable
for confidential bank supervisory information account for an underestimation of the
unemployment rate, and for an overestimation of the inflation rate.
They also tested whether the FOMC decisions reflect supervisory information.
Using a multinomial Logit estimation, they estimated the following equation:
prob(V )i,t = λ1,i + λ2,iEFt + λ3,iPt + µi,t, (2.4)
where i means easing or tightening policy, EF is economic forecasts taken from the
Greenbook. Note that equation (2.4) generates the probability of easing or tight-
ening of monetary policy, relative to leaving policy unchanged. The test results of
this equation is also striking in that λ3,i, the coefficient of the proxy variable for
confidential bank supervisory information, is both an economically and a statistically
significant determinant of monetary policy, which means that the FOMC does utilize
the confidential bank supervisory information in policy making.
Finally, they tested whether the FOMC decisions take “too-big-to-fail” into con-
sideration in order to check whether the Fed needs to have a direct bank supervi-
sory role. Specifically, they added a variable of LPt measuring the percentage of
CAMEL4-rated assets among the 50 largest banks. The idea is that sometimes the
bank regulator needs to consider “too-big-to-fail” in a practical sense. Specifically,
“too-big-to-fail” may manifest itself in a reluctance by bank regulator to provide the
lowest rating, CAMEL5, on the largest banks. Hence, sometimes CAMEL4 could ac-
tually mean CAMEL5, especially for large banks. However, in order to guarantee the
effectiveness of monetary policy, the FOMC should understand which CAMEL4-rated
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banks are actually CAMEL5-rated banks. They estimated the following equations:
Xt+i = α0 + α1tX
e
j,t+i + α2LPt + α3Pt + εj,t+i, (2.5)
prob(V )i,t = λ1,i + λ2,iEFt + λ3,iLPt + λ4,iPt + µi,t. (2.6)
Test results show that α2, α3, λ3, and λ4 are all significantly different from zero. This
means that both bank supervisory information on Pt and LPt do have something to
do with actual economic values, and that the FOMC utilize both pieces of information
in policy making. Based on these results, they argued that the Fed should keep a
direct role in bank supervision because, without a direct role, it is almost impossible
to distinguish this subtle difference even though it can access to bank supervisory
information.
3. Model: A Game-theoretic Analysis
Direct interpretation of the findings of Peek et al. (1999) is that there should be
a systematic error in conducting monetary policy if the central bank does not have
an ability to access to the bank supervisory information, or, more aggressively, if the
central bank does not have any bank supervisory role. The main purpose of this paper
is to show a possible explanation about why there should be a systematic error, and
why there should not be if the central bank has a bank supervisory role. To address
this question, I will adopt a game-theoretic approach focusing on the interaction
between the central bank and a representative commercial bank. The pioneering
papers in the literature on monetary policy games are Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983). Subsequent studies are summarized in Rogoff (1989)
and Benjamin Friedman (1993) (see Caplin and Leahy (1996)). Basically, I will
follow the ideas these papers suggest. However, following Poole (1970), I return to
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the old idea that policy makers are ignorant of contemporary shocks, i.e., they do
not understand whether the shock is permanent or temporary, while incorporating
the more recent notion that private agents react to policy rules.
After setting up the environment of the economy, we are going to study three
different cases depending on how the responsibilities of bank supervision are assigned.
The reason we have three different cases is that, if the central bank does not have a
bank supervisory role, then, there should be another government agency specializing
in bank supervision. Hence, depending on the relationship between the two authori-
ties, we have the following different cases: (i) When the central bank does not have a
bank supervisory role, and the central bank and another government agency special-
izing in bank supervision do not cooperate with each other. Examples are the United
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Japan, and South Korea. (ii) When the central bank has a
bank supervisory role, i.e., the central bank is also the bank supervisory authority.
The United States belongs to this case. (iii) When the central bank does not have a
bank supervisory role, and the central bank and another government agency specializ-
ing in bank supervision do cooperate each other, i.e., the two authorities are expected
(or obliged) to cooperate with each other as far as the objective of each authority
can be kept safe. The best example is the former Bundesbank. Let me emphasize
the distinction between cases (i) and (iii). In the case of (i), the two authorities do
not care about each other, i.e., the two authorities only pursue their own policy goals
without regarding the other’s policy performances.
The first case will be the main focus of this paper, i.e., why there should be
a systematic error in conducting monetary policy. In the second and third cases,
we will investigate if two practically available ways are good enough to eliminate the
systematic error and, thus, to guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy. One way
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is to give a direct bank supervisory role to the central bank. The other way is to set
up another government agency specializing in bank supervision, i.e., bank regulator.
Finally, based on the findings from the first case, we will seek some implications on
the current trend surrounding the central banking systems.
3.1. Environment
There is a central bank whose objective is to minimize the following Barro-
Gordon type loss function at every period t, given as
min
it
Lt = a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2 , (2.7)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters, pit(i) is inflation rate, it is nominal interest
rate, pi is the central bank’s inflation target associated with its interest rate target, yt
is aggregate output, and y is the economy’s natural output. Note that it is assumed
that the inflation rate is a function of the interest rate. In fact, this is the only
difference in the loss functions between Barro and Gordon (1983) and this paper.
The central bank can control inflation directly in Barro and Gordon (1983) while
the central bank can only control the interest rate in this paper. Also note that,
according to the definitions in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), the central bank in
this model follows a flexible inflation targeting policy. In their paper, they defined
strict inflation targeting as referring to the situation where only inflation enters the
loss function, while flexible inflation targeting allows other goal variables. However,
we already know that inflation targeting policy and interest rate targeting policy
are basically the same if we assume that it is the interest rate not inflation which
the central bank can directly control, and that inflation is a function of the interest
rate. Hence, it is clear that, in our model, the central bank follows an interest rate
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target policy regime. Considering the recent changes in monetary policy regimes
across almost all major central banks in the world, this assumption captures reality.
Furthermore, in our model, it is assumed that the central bank can exactly control
the inflation rate through interest rate manipulation. Also, we assume that there is
no time-inconsistency problem in conducting monetary policy, and that the economy
does not have any banking crises.
There is a representative commercial bank whose objective is profit maximiza-
tion. We assume that its objective function is given by
max
kt+1,nt,at,lt
Πt = f(kt+1, nt, at, lt : it, kt), (2.8)
where Πt is profit at period t, and kt, nt, at, and lt are, respectively, bank capital,
labor employed, bank assets, and bank liability at period t. It is also assumed that
there is perfect competition in banking industry. Note that the profit function in
(2.8) has a very general form. Especially, at and lt should be interpreted to include
all kinds of future terms which should be discounted suitably. The reason the term
kt+1 is included is that, at the time of t, the control variable is kt+1 not kt as far as
capital is concerned. More specifically, it could be set up as a simplified version given
by
max
Bt,nt,kt+1
Πt = itBt −Wtnt − Pt(kt+1 − kt), (2.9)
where Bt is bank lending, Wt is wage, Pt is the price of capital. Here, we assume that
the only asset is bank lending and there is no liability. Factor markets are assumed
to be complete.
There is only one shock in each period. The shock occurs at the beginning of
each period. The shock could be permanent or temporary. When a shock occurs, it is
assumed that, following Poole (1970), the central bank does not understand whether
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the shock is permanent or temporary, while the commercial bank does know what it
is. The central bank, however, is assumed to have the ability to find out what the
new steady state values are for inflation and aggregate supply at the time when there
is a permanent shock, if and only if it can acquire adequate information. Also, it
is assumed that the shock will reveal itself next period so that the central bank can
surely understand what happened in the previous period. These assumptions also
reflect a reality. Since commercial banks keep contacting continuously with the real
sector on business, it is reasonable for us to assume that the representative commercial
bank in the model understands what is going on in the real sector. Also, some risky
commercial banks themselves could be a shock to the economy. However, when there
is a shock, the central bank can only see resultant movements on the interest rate,
inflation rate, and aggregate output. It takes time for policy makers to get adequate
economic data. Another important assumption is that, when a shock occurs, the
shock should affect aggregate output. This assumption is important as will be shown
later.
Aggregate output is given by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function of the form
yt = y + (pit − piet ). (2.10)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the Fisher equation always holds in this economy1.
Hence,
piet = it − rt, (2.11)
where rt is real interest rate, it is nominal interest rate, and pi
e
t is the expected inflation
1In fact, we might not need this assumption since, as Romer (2002) indicated,
equation (2.11) is considered the Fisher identity. By definition, the real interest
rate is the difference between the nominal interest rate and expected inflation, i.e.,
r ≡ i− pie. Also, note that the Fisher equation is a direct implication of a standard
representative agent model with either money-in-utility or cash-in-advance.
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rate.
It is important to understand the role of Fisher equation in this model. As shown
above, the central bank is assumed to be able to exactly control inflation through
manipulating the nominal interest rate. This means the inflation rate should change
when the central bank changes the nominal interest rate. Hence, under rational
expectations, it needs to be the case that, when the central bank changes the nominal
interest rate, not only the inflation rate but the expected inflation rate should change.
In other words, in the context of the current model, it would be very natural that
we should think that any changes in the nominal interest rate, it, will somehow
affect expected inflation2. Hence, we need a set-up which can show how expected
inflation evolves along the changes in the nominal interest rate. The Fisher equation
is the most well-known and acceptable relationship between the nominal interest rate
and expected inflation. Note that, by this assumption, we can specify how expected
inflation adjusts to any changes in the nominal interest rate. Also, note that equation
(2.11) means that, if the central bank changes the nominal interest rate, it, then
expected inflation should change by the same amount as the nominal interest rate
changed because the central bank does not have the ability to change the real interest
rate, rt.
Therefore, as time goes by, the economy behaves as follows: (i) at the beginning
of each period, there occurs a shock; (ii) the central bank is required to react to the
shock through manipulating interest rate, it, just after the shock occurred because
2Barro and Gordon (1983) show the existence of time inconsistency in monetary
policy by assuming that, at time t, the policy maker considers expected inflation,
piet , as given. Unlike Barro and Gordon (1983), in the current model, the central
bank policy makers are not allowed to consider expected inflation as given. This is
because it should be the case that they understand how expected inflation adjusts to
the changes in nominal interest rate. This supports one of our assumptions that, in
this economy, there is no time inconsistency problem.
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its goal is given by (2.7); (iii) since both (i) and (ii) occur at the beginning of each
period, piet is also formed at the beginning of the period of t, by all economic agents,
after watching the shock and the central bank’s reaction; (iv) then, the economic
performances are governed by (2.10).
Finally, it is assumed that the central bank and the commercial bank keep talking
to each other every period about the state of the economy, and that the commercial
bank is the only source for the central bank to ask about the state of the economy.
This assumption reflects the reality that central banks are, especially in modern times,
considered as an important market participant communicating with other private
financial intermediaries, and that commercial banks are still important as the main
part of a monetary transmission mechanism.
3.2. When the Central Bank Does Not Have a Bank Supervisory Role
In this first case, the problem we are facing is clear. Notice that, since the
central bank has the ability to control the inflation rate exactly through interest rate
manipulation, if the central bank can acquire accurate information about the state
of the economy, i.e., about the particular shock, the central bank can always exercise
the optimal policy. Hence, the whole problem rests on whether the representative
commercial bank has an adequate incentive to tell the truth about the shock to the
central bank.
3.2.1. Reaction Function of the Central Bank
Assume that, originally, the economy is in a steady state. This means that,
before a shock occurs, the inflation rate and aggregate output stay at those desired
values of pi and y, and, hence, the value of the central bank’s loss function is zero.
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Now, when there is a shock, the problem of the central bank is given as minimizing
the loss function subject to (2.10) and (2.11)3. Hence,
min
it
Lt = a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [pit(it)− it + rt]2 . (2.12)
The resulting first-order condition is
∂Lt
∂it
= 2a(pit(it)− pi)∂pit
∂it
+ 2b(pit(it)− it + rt)(∂pit
∂it
− 1) = 0. (2.13)
If we simplify the first-order condition, we will get
∂pit
∂it
[2a(pit(it)− pi) + 2b(pit(it)− it + rt)] = 2b((pit(it)− it + rt). (2.14)
Finally, since pit(it)− it + rt = yt − y, we have
∂pit
∂it
[
a(pit(it)− pi)
b(yt − y) + 1] = 1. (2.15)
The above equation of (2.15) can be rewritten without time subscripts, since all time
subscripts refer to the current period. Then, we have
∂pi
∂i
[
a(pi − pi)
b(y − y) + 1] = 1. (2.16)
Equation (2.16) defines the reaction function of the central bank. To understand
the reaction function more clearly, it might be helpful to reformulate it as following
3Let me emphasize again the role of the Fisher equation in this model. By incor-
porating the constraint of the Fisher equation, we can capture the effect of the central
bank’s manipulating nominal interest rate on expected inflation. Assuming that the
Fisher equation always holds, it should be the case that, if the central bank changes
the nominal interest rate, it, then expected inflation should be changed as well. Note
that, without this constraint, i.e.,
min
it
Lt = a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [pit(it)− piet ]2 ,
we cannot say anything how expected inflation will change when the nominal interest
rate, it, changes.
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equation
∆pi[
a(pi − pi)
b(y − y) + 1] = ∆i. (2.17)
Note that, once the economy had a shock, and the inflation rate and aggregate output
deviated from the original steady state values, the term of [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] became a
constant at the time when the shock occurred. Also, note that the changes in pit and
yt are known to everybody after a shock. Hence, if the central bank understands how
the shock affected the economy’s steady state values, i.e., pi and y, the central bank
can exactly pick up how much it needs to change the inflation rate, ∆pi. Therefore,
the central bank’s task is determined as picking up ∆i, i.e., just manipulating the
interest rate which is enough to achieve the desired ∆pi, taking the constant term into
consideration.
Considering the well-known fact that the steady state inflation rate is determined
by the money growth rate, it may be wondered how the steady state inflation rate
can change without any changes in the money growth rate. It can be understood
clearly, however, if we remind the relationship in Christiano and Rostagno (2001),
i.e., R˜ = pi
β
− 1. If the Fed follows a monetary aggregate targeting policy, then, pi
is fixed because pi is determined by the money growth rate. Hence, when there is a
permanent change in β, R˜ should change permanently in order to get the equilibrium
recovered. However, if the Fed follows an interest rate targeting policy, then, R˜ is
fixed so that pi will change permanently when there is a permanent change in β. In
the current model, the Fed follows a strict interest rate targeting policy. Therefore,
when there is a permanent shock, pi should change permanently.
Also, it may be wondered how the inflation rate can be determinate if the Fed
can change the nominal interest rate without depending on any other variables. This
is the price-level indeterminacy problem which is often noted as a potential problem
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with an interest rate targeting policy. However, if we admit that it is the nominal
money supply that the Fed can actually control to achieve the target nominal interest
rate, then, as McCallum (1986) indicated, the price-level indeterminacy problem will
not arise. Suppose that the economy reached to a new steady state after a permanent
shock raised the steady state inflation rate while the steady state nominal interest rate
remained unchanged. And suppose that the Fed does not like the new inflation rate
and it wants to lower the inflation rate to the previous. If the Fed has the ability to
change the nominal interest rate without depending on any other variables, then, the
Fed can get it done easily by lowering the nominal interest rate. However, if the Fed
has to depend on increasing the nominal money supply to lower the nominal interest
rate, then, the Fed could not get the inflation rate lowered. In fact, the inflation rate
will explode. This is because, as we saw above, since the steady state inflation rate
is determined by the money growth rate, if the Fed wants to lower the inflation rate
below the steady state, it will cause an increase of the money growth rate, i.e., the
inflation rate.
There are two important things we need to note. First, the reaction function has
a striking similarity to the conventional Taylor rule. Under the conventional Taylor
rule, the level of the nominal interest rate is determined by the current level of two
variables, the rate of inflation and measure of the output gap, the deviation of actual
output from potential, so:
it = a+ b1pit + b2(y − y∗)t, (2.18)
where a is the equilibrium real interest rate (usually about 2% or 3%). To understand
this argument, we need to look at equation (2.17). Again, note that the term of
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[a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] is a constant. Let us denote the constant term as c, then, we have
c∆pi = ∆i, (2.19)
which can be rewritten as
i = i∗ + c(pi − pi∗), (2.20)
where i∗ and pi∗ are steady state interest and inflation rates, respectively. In fact, if
we impose two of the main assumptions, the aggregate supply function and the Fisher
equation, into the conventional Taylor rule in (2.18), we can derive exactly the same
result shown by (2.20).
Second, when there is a shock, the aggregate output should be affected. If not,
the central bank can never achieve its target even though it increases (or decreases)
the interest rate to infinity. This can be easily verified through equation (2.17).
Suppose, after a shock, the inflation rate deviated from its steady state, but aggregate
output remained at the steady state. Then, according to (2.17), we need an infinite
increase (or decrease) in the interest rate. This point might have a relationship
with a rising criticism of the Taylor rule (see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b), and Christiano and Rostagno (2001)) because the
central bank’s reaction function given by (2.17) is, in effect, a modified Taylor rule
as we saw above. However, I will not discuss this point more deeply because it is
not related to the topic of this paper, i.e., the relationship between monetary policy
and bank supervision. Actually, since we assume that the central bank can exactly
control the inflation rate through interest rate manipulation, this kind of phenomenon
is precluded by assumption. Hence, to secure the assumption that the central bank
can exactly control the inflation rate through interest rate manipulation, we need
another assumption that, when there is a shock, it should affect aggregate output.
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Table 1. Central Bank’s Reaction
state of the economy c > 0 c < 0
after a shock ∆pi > 0 ∆pi < 0 ∆pi > 0 ∆pi < 0
central bank’s reaction ∆i > 0 ∆i < 0 ∆i < 0 ∆i > 0
Now, the reaction of the central bank to a shock can be summarized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 In an optimal reaction of the central bank to a shock, ∆pi and ∆i
will have a positive relation if [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] > 0, and ∆pi and ∆i will have a negative
relation if [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] < 0.
In equation (2.17), if the constant term [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] is positive, then, when the
cental bank needs to decrease the inflation rate, i.e., ∆pi is negative, the central bank
should decrease the interest rate, i.e., ∆i should be negative. On the contrary, if the
constant term [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] is negative, then, when the cental bank needs to decrease
the inflation rate, i.e., ∆pi is negative, the central bank should increase the interest
rate, i.e., ∆i should be positive. Denoting the constant term [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] as c, this
optimal reaction of the central bank to a shock can be summarized by Table 1.
3.2.2. Reaction Function of the Commercial Bank
We need to note that how the reaction of the central bank affects the commercial
bank purely depends on the commercial bank’s profit function. Let us consider the
general form profit function of the commercial bank, i.e.,
max
kt+1,nt,at,lt
Πt = f(kt+1, nt, at, lt : it, kt). (2.21)
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Note that, since the interest rate is the control variable of the central bank, the interest
rate is considered as a parameter in the view of the commercial bank. Therefore, the
effect of the central bank’s reaction on the commercial bank’s profit can be calculated
simply by applying the envelope theorem. The important thing in analyzing the
reaction of the commercial bank is that the effect of the central bank’s reaction on the
commercial bank’s profit should be either positive or negative, ∂Πt
∂it
> 0 or ∂Πt
∂it
< 0, i.e.,
it cannot be both simultaneously. Considering the nature of the envelope theorem,
it is natural that we should have this conclusion. For example, if we assume, more
specifically, a simple form of profit function as we set up in (2.9),
max
Bt,nt,kt+1
Πt = itBt −Wtnt − Pt(kt+1 − kt), (2.22)
the effect of interest rate change on the commercial bank’s profit should be always
positive, i.e.,
∂Πt
∂it
= Bt > 0, (2.23)
such that when the interest rate increases, the commercial bank’s profit always in-
creases.
By assumption, when there is a shock, the commercial bank exactly knows how
the shock affects the economy, i.e., it fully understands whether the shock is per-
manent or temporary. Furthermore, it should be the case that the commercial bank
fully understands how the central bank reacts to a shock. Now, note that there could
be a temporary shock or a permanent shock. Assume that, when there is a shock,
both the inflation rate and aggregate output deviate from their previous steady state
values. Then, there will be eight different cases. Also, assume that, when there is a
permanent shock, not only pi and y but pi and y move together in the same direction.
However, when there is a permanent shock, pi and y are assumed to move less than
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pi and y. This means that, when there is a permanent shock at t, (pi − pi) < 0 and
(y − y) < 0 if pi and y increase due to a permanent shock. These assumptions are
just for analytical convenience since, by these assumptions, we can reduce the number
of cases to analyze. In fact, these assumptions do not affect the general conclusion.
Meanwhile, it is needless to say that only pi and y will change when there is a tem-
porary shock. Then, the reaction of the commercial bank is summarized as following
proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that, when there is a shock, both the inflation rate and ag-
gregate output deviate from their previous steady state values. Also, assume that,
when there is a permanent shock, not only pi and y but pi and y move together in
the same direction as their related steady state variables. [I] Then, if ∂Πt
∂it
> 0, the
dominant strategy for the commercial bank’s reaction is that (i), if c > 0, telling the
central bank that the shock is permanent if the inflation rate goes up after a shock,
and telling the central bank that the shock is temporary if the inflation rate goes down
after a shock, and that (ii), if c < 0, vice versa. [II] If ∂Πt
∂it
< 0, the dominant strategy
for the commercial bank’s reaction is the opposite of the case where ∂Πt
∂it
> 0.
Assume that for the commercial bank, ∂Πt
∂it
> 0. Note that there are eight cases
since we adopted the assumptions in the above proposition. Then, the optimal reac-
tion of the commercial bank can be shown in Table 2.
Here, (i) denotes the central bank’s optimal reaction if it understands what
happened in the real sector, and (ii) denotes the commercial bank’s optimal reaction.
Look at case (1). In this case, c = [a(pi−pi)
b(y−y) + 1] should be positive. Note that the
movements of pi and y at the time of a shock are known to everybody. Hence, we
don’t have to worry about the possibility of c < 0. Since it is a temporary shock, if
the central bank understands the fact that (pi − pi) > 0, i.e., if it understands that
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Table 2. Commercial Bank’s Reaction When ∂Πt
∂it
> 0
state of the economy c > 0 c < 0
after a shock ∆pi > 0 ∆pi < 0 ∆pi > 0 ∆pi < 0
temporary shock
(1) pi ↑, y ↑ (i) −− ∆i < 0 −− −−
(ii) tell a lie −−
(2) pi ↑, y ↓ (i) −− ∆i < 0 −− ∆i > 0
(ii) tell a lie tell the truth
(3) pi ↓, y ↑ (i) ∆i > 0 −− ∆i < 0 −−
(ii) tell the truth tell a lie
(4) pi ↓, y ↓ (i) ∆i > 0 −− −− −−
(ii) tell the truth −−
permanent shock
(5) pi ↑, y ↑ (i) ∆i > 0 −− −− −−
(ii) tell the truth −−
(6) pi ↑, y ↓ (i) ∆i > 0 −− ∆i < 0 −−
(ii) tell the truth tell a lie
(7) pi ↓, y ↑ (i) −− ∆i < 0 −− ∆i > 0
(ii) tell a lie tell the truth
(8) pi ↓, y ↓ (i) −− ∆i < 0 −− −−
(ii) tell a lie −−
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it needs to decrease the inflation rate, i.e., ∆pi < 0, then, its optimal policy will be
characterized as ∆i < 0. However, it goes directly against the commercial bank’s
interest. The commercial bank understands how the central bank reacts to a shock.
The dominant strategy for the commercial bank is to lie to the central bank. Note
that, in case (5), when there is a permanent shock, the optimal policy will be ∆i > 0.
Therefore, in order to maximize its profit, the commercial bank will lie to the central
bank just like the shock was permanent.
Now, look at case (2). In this case, if c > 0, the subsequent story is exactly the
same as the above case of (1). However, if c < 0, the subsequent story is exactly
the opposite to the above case (1). Note that, at the time when a shock occurs, the
central bank does not understand if the value of c is positive or negative. All other
cases can be understood based on the same logic. Also, note that, if ∂Πt
∂it
< 0, the
reaction of the commercial bank will be exactly the opposite of Table 2.
3.2.3. Equilibrium
It should be the case that the central bank understands what the commercial
bank will reveal about a relevant shock. Therefore, there is no reason for the cen-
tral bank to believe what the commercial bank tells about the shock. The rational
behavior of the central bank, then, will be conducting monetary policy based on its
own expectation on the shock.
Proposition 3 Assume that the central bank is risk averse. Then, the central bank’s
reaction to a shock in equilibrium is summarized as
∆i = E[c∆pi] = E[∆pi[
a(pi − pi)
b(y − y) + 1]]. (2.24)
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Suppose that the economy is at the case of (1), (4), (5) or (8) in Table 2. If the
probability that this economy has a permanent shock is q, then, the reaction of the
central bank will be
∆i = E[c∆pi] = q[∆pipcp] + (1− q)[∆pitct], (2.25)
where ∆pip and cp are the associated values under a permanent shock of each case, and
∆pit and ct are the associated values under a temporary shock of each case. Suppose
that the economy is at the case of (2), (3), (6) or (7) in Table 2. If the probability
that this economy has a positive c, i.e., c > 0, is r, then, the reaction of the central
bank will be
∆i = E[c∆pi] = r {q[∆pipcp] + (1− q)[∆pitct]} (2.26)
+(1− r) {q[∆pipcp] + (1− q)[∆pitct]} .
The point is that there should be a systematic error in conducting monetary pol-
icy. The amount of the systematic error in conducting monetary policy will be the
difference between (2.17) and (2.25) or (2.26).
3.3. When Central Bank Has a Bank Supervisory Role
Now, assume that the central bank has a bank supervisory role. The meaning of
this assumption is that the central bank can impose an appropriate penalty on the
commercial bank when it is found that the commercial bank told a lie to the central
bank about the shock. Since we assumed that the shock reveals itself after one period,
there is no reason for the commercial bank to tell a lie to the central bank no matter
what the shock is.
Note that, since the shock reveals itself after one period, in the case where the
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commercial bank lied, the central bank can exactly calculate how much the commer-
cial bank earned by telling a lie. Hence, it is always possible for the central bank to
impose a penalty such that the penalty is bigger than or equal to the amount the
commercial bank earned by telling a lie, i.e.,
Penalty ≥
[
∂Πt
∂it
]
,
which means that telling the truth is always a dominant strategy for the commercial
bank.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the shock reveals itself after a certain period. The cen-
tral bank can eliminate the systematic error if it keeps a bank supervisory role which
involves imposing penalties against those commercial banks which told a lie to the
central bank about the shock.
Here, the important thing is that we are assuming that the central bank can im-
pose penalties if it has a bank supervisory role, and that it cannot impose penalties
if it does not have a bank supervisory role. Note that, if the central bank can im-
pose penalties exactly against those commercial banks which lied to the central bank
without a bank supervisory role, it could be a better solution than giving a bank
supervisory role to the central bank. Considering the basic functions and objectives
of monetary policy and bank supervision, however, this does not seem to be reality
from the view of practical assignment of the two functions.
The assumption that the central bank can impose penalties against the commercial
bank only if it has a bank supervisory role can be justified by the two following points.
First, in a normative view, the two functions are based on different fields. Monetary
policy is a macroeconomic policy while bank supervision is a microeconomic policy.
Monetary policy is supposed to affect the whole economy in an indiscriminating
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manner. Bank supervision is supposed to treat each bank individually. Note that
the reason bank supervision is called for is that all governments provide some form
of a safety net to the banking system, whether it is explicit or implicit, they need to
take steps to limit the moral hazard and adverse selection that the safety net creates
(see Mishkin (2000)). Otherwise, banks will have such a strong incentive to take
on excessive risks that the safety net may do more harm than good and promote
banking crises rather than prevent them. Bank supervision, in which the supervisor
establishes regulations to prevent excessive risk taking and then monitors banks to
see that they are complying with these regulations, is thus needed to ensure the safety
and soundness of the banking system. Therefore, it is impossible for the central bank
to impose penalties against commercial banks in a discriminating manner without
a bank supervisory role. Second, in a practical view, without a bank supervisory
role, the central bank cannot have the ability to identify which banks did tell a lie
to itself, i.e., the central bank cannot identify true lies. Without a bank supervisory
role, the central bank cannot have an adequate tool to monitor the commercial bank.
Therefore, since it cannot check how the commercial bank’s balance sheet changes in
a timely manner, even after the shock revealed itself, the central bank may not be
sure if a particular bank really told a lie. For example, there could be a situation
in which a particular commercial bank told the truth to the central bank but, later,
along the changing situation, it could be considered a liar.
However, there rises another problem by giving a bank supervisory role to the
central bank. By giving a bank supervisory role to the central bank, we can guarantee
to eliminate the systematic error. However, it does not mean that it guarantees the
effectiveness in conducting monetary policy. This is so because, by definition, the
effectiveness is accomplished by minimizing the loss function of the central bank
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given by (2.7), which is shown below again:
min
it
Lt = a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2 . (2.27)
The difficulty is that, if the central bank has a bank supervisory role, its objective
loss function might also be transformed to reflect the objective of bank supervision,
i.e., banking system stability.
Taking the risk of too much simplification, suppose the loss function is trans-
formed as below:
min
it,ot
Lt = a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2 + f [st(ot)− s]2, (2.28)
where f > 0 is a parameter, st is a variable representing banking system stability, s
is the steady state value of the variable, and ot is a control variable affecting st. Note
that, as far as the two control variables are not related to each other, the central bank
can achieve both objectives successfully. However, if there is some relation between
the two control variables, then, the value of the loss function in (2.27) should be higher
when the central bank’s objective is given by (2.28). Hence, there is a trade-off. In
fact, this point reflects so-called conflict of interests which has been argued in the
traditional debate. Here, the point is that the way of giving a direct bank supervisory
role to the central bank cannot guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy.
3.4. When There Is Another Government Agency Specializing in Bank Supervision
Suppose there is another government agency specializing in bank supervision
such as a bank regulator. Hence, the central bank has no bank supervisory role. Note
that it could be the best solution if there were no problem in cooperation between the
central bank and the bank regulator. The central bank can always achieve its objective
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represented by (2.27) without having any systematic error in conducting monetary
policy if the bank regulator provides any necessary information for monetary policy in
a timely manner, and if the bank regulator imposes any necessary penalties against
the commercial bank as the central bank wants. Meanwhile, the bank regulator
can focus on its own objective function without worrying about the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
However, this best solution is not feasible as the following proposition summa-
rizes:
Proposition 5 Let V1 denote the value of the loss function in (2.27) when the central
bank can access to any kind of bank supervisory information without any restriction,
and without any bank supervisory role. Let V2 denote the value of the loss function
in (2.27) when the central bank does not have a bank supervisory role because there is
another government agency specializing in bank supervision. Then, V1 < V2.
The proof of this proposition purely depends on the objective function of the
bank regulator. We can think of two extreme cases about the objective function of
the bank regulator. One case is that it is the same as that of the commercial bank.
The other case is that it is the same as that of the central bank. Note that, however,
the objective function of bank regulator cannot be the same as that of the central
bank. If they are the same, we would not have to establish two different government
agencies. Suppose, as an extreme case, the objective function of bank regulator is
the same as that of the commercial bank, the profit maximization of the commercial
bank. Then, the equilibrium is exactly the same as what we saw in (2.24). If and
only if the objective function is the same as that of the central bank, can we have
V1 = V2. However, we already know that this cannot be the case.
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If the economy remains stable, the values of V1 and V2 could be similar. However,
once the economy becomes unstable, the problem could also get bigger, resulting in
a much bigger V2 than V1. As Greenspan indicated, a single regulator with a narrow
view of banking system stability and with no responsibility for the macroeconomic
implications of its decisions would inevitably have a long-term bias against risk-taking
and innovation. Note that, for a single bank regulator with no responsibility for the
macroeconomic consequences, the incentives are clear because it receives no pay-offs
for contributing to economic growth through facilitating prudent risk-taking, but it
is severely criticized for too many bank failures.
The point is that the way of setting up another government agency specializing
in bank supervision cannot guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy, either.
However, there is a distinct difference between the two cases. In the first case, the
systematic error can be eliminated while the problem comes from a conflict of inter-
ests. In the second case, the problem stems from the fact that the systematic error
cannot be fully eliminated.
3.5. Combination vs. Separation
It has been shown that both ways, i.e., giving a direct bank supervisory role to
the central bank and setting up a bank regulator, are not good enough to guarantee
the effectiveness of monetary policy. We could compare relative effectiveness between
those two ways, but it does not seem to be meaningful because it is almost impossible
to get sizable results. Limitations come from two sources. First, setting up a specific
objective function for a bank regulator is difficult. Second, measuring the values of
V1 and V2 is actually impossible.
Therefore, in discussing which is better between combining or separating the two
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functions, the only available way seems to compare the two ways in the view of social
welfare, not in the view of the effectiveness of monetary policy. In other words, it is
about comparing the conflict-of-interests problem and the systematic error problem
in conducting monetary policy in the view of social welfare. Considering the two
following propositions, it can be argued that the central bank should take the whole
responsibility or at least a partial responsibility on bank supervision, directly against
the current trend surrounding central banking systems. Look back at the transformed
loss function in (2.28). The key point on how to assign the two functions, monetary
policy and bank supervision, is how much the two control variables, it and ot, in
(2.28) are related to each other.
Proposition 6 Let W1 denote the social welfare when the central bank has a bank
supervisory role, and let W2 denote the social welfare when the central bank does not
have a bank supervisory role because there is another government agency specializing
in bank supervision. If the two control variables in (2.28) are never correlated with
each other, and the commercial bank’s profit is included in st, then, W1 = W2.
Since the two control variables are not correlated, we have the following result:
min
it,ot
{
a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2 + f [st(ot)− s]2
}
(2.29)
= min
it
{
a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2
}
+min
ot
f [st(ot)− s]2.
This means that it is indifferent whether the central bank has a bank supervisory
role or there is another government agency specializing in bank supervision. Notice
that, by assumption that the two control variables are not correlated, the interest
rate cannot affect banking system stability, including the commercial bank’s profit.
The assumption that the two control variables are not correlated implies that the
interest rate does not affect the commercial bank’s profit if the profit is included in
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the category of banking system stability. Therefore, there need not be a systematic
error like we saw in (2.24). However, it should be the case that, if the commercial
bank’s profit is not included in st, then, W1 > W2.
Proposition 7 Let W3 denote the social welfare when the central bank has a bank
supervisory role, and let W4 denote the social welfare when the central bank does not
have a bank supervisory role because there is another government agency specializing
in bank supervision. If the two control variables in (2.28) are correlated with each
other, then, W3 > W4.
Since the two control variables are correlated, we have the following result:
min
it,ot
{
a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2 + f [st(ot)− s]2
}
(2.30)
< min
it
{
a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y]2
}
+min
ot
f [st(ot)− s]2.
It can be shown clearly if we assume it and ot are perfectly correlated, then, it = ot.
In this case, since the bank regulator has actually no ability to achieve its goal while
the central bank does not care about banking system stability, W4 should be lower
than W3. Note that this relationship holds whether the correlation is positive or
negative. Suppose that it and ot are perfectly negatively correlated, then, it = −ot.
Considering the fact that all components have quadratic forms, it is easy to see that
the above relationship still holds. Also, note that, in this case, the inequality holds
regardless of whether the commercial bank’s profit is included in the category of
banking system stability. However, it is clear that, the more correlated those two
control variables are, the bigger value of loss function we will have, and, therefore,
the welfare difference will be larger between the two cases because of the existence of
systematic error in conducting monetary policy. Notice that W1 and W3 incorporate
the conflict-of-interests problem while W2 and W4 do the systematic error problem in
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conducting monetary policy.
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) gives some clues on this argument:
.... These examples suggest that the potential for conflict between reg-
ulatory and monetary objectives depends to some large extent on the
structure of the banking and financial systems. The more such a system
involves intermediaries financing maturity mismatch positions through
wholesale markets in a competitive milieu, the greater such dangers of
conflict are likely to be. .... It is, therefore, at least possible to argue that
where such conflicts really become important (in an open, competitive,
market-driven system), they have to be internalized within a single au-
thority to obtain an efficient resolution. Where such conflicts have been
less pressing, because of a differing structure, e.g., in Germany and Japan,
it is easier to maintain the luxury of a separation of responsibilities. One
of the reasons why such separation may be regarded as a luxury is that
the function of regulation has rarely received plaudits from the public or
the politicians. ....
The possible contribution of this paper concerning this point is that this paper
clarified the arguments of Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) using the comparison
between the conflict-of-interests problem and the systematic error problem in con-
ducting monetary policy in the view of social welfare.
4. Conclusion
This paper begins with the observation that, as Peek et al. (1999) shows, there
is a systematic error in making monetary policy if the central bank does not have any
bank supervisory role. Based on this observation, this paper investigates why there
should be a systematic error in making monetary policy. This task has been addressed
using a simple game-theoretic approach. In this approach, the most critical assump-
tion is that there is a asymmetric information about state of the economy between the
central bank and commercial bank. As Caplin and Leahy (1996) indicated, monetary
policy makers must steer a course between inflation and unemployment, and they
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must do so with only limited information concerning the state of the economy and
its reaction to the tools of policy.
The implications of this paper can be summarized as follows: (i) it is inevitable
for the central bank to have a systematic error in conducting monetary policy when the
central bank does not have a bank supervisory role; (ii) without a bank supervisory
role, the effectiveness of monetary policy cannot be guaranteed; (iii) because of the
existence of conflict of interests, giving a bank supervisory role to the central bank
does not guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy, either; (iv) the way of setting
up another government agency, bank regulator, and making the central bank and the
regulator cooperate each other does not guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy
because, in this way, the systematic error in conducting monetary policy cannot
be eliminated; (v) in the view of social welfare, not in the view of effectiveness of
monetary policy, it is better for the central bank to keep the whole responsibility or
at least a partial responsibility on bank supervision.
The most notable point among the results is that, if the central bank does have
a bank supervisory role, the bank supervisory role acts as a truth-telling mechanism
when commercial banks communicate with the central bank about true state of the
economy. In a situation in which the central bank is ignorant of a shock and com-
mercial banks are aware of the shock, commercial banks should be considered as
the most important source for the central bank to find out the current state of the
economy. Without a bank supervisory role as a truth-telling mechanism, the central
bank cannot avoid a systematic error in conducting monetary policy, especially when
it follows an interest rate targeting policy. Although giving a bank supervisory role
to the central bank does not guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy, i.e., it
is not an optimal solution in terms of the effectiveness of monetary policy, it is the
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optimal solution in terms of social welfare, among practically available options for
institutional set-up arranging the responsibilities of conducting monetary policy and
bank supervision.
These implications have significant meaning on the current trend surrounding
central banking systems around the world. As we saw in the introduction, many
countries have been considering whether bank supervisory responsibilities are an im-
portant function for the central bank or are better assigned to a separate government
agency. The results in this paper indicate that the current trend surrounding central
banking systems around the world is not on the right track. These implications may
be even more important in many other countries, particularly developing countries,
since, in these countries, the credit markets are usually bank-centered, and the bank-
ing industry structures are often far from perfect competition. Lack of competition
in the banking industry will strengthen the market power of commercial banks, and,
under this situation, if the central bank does not have any bank supervisory role, a
selfish profit maximizing behavior of commercial banks could significantly lower the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
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CHAPTER III
BUSINESS CYCLES UNDER THE TAYLOR RULE:
AN ANSWER TO SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
1. Introduction
Real business cycle (RBC) models have been surprisingly successful at account-
ing for several non-monetary features of U.S. business cycles. As Christiano (1991)
indicated, however, they have been less successful once money is involved. Serious
works with a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model under no frictions
except money include King and Plosser (1984), Cooley and Hansen (1989), Cooley
and Hansen (1995), and Walsh (2003).
The most important failures in RBC models with money can be summarized as
following: First, as Cooley and Hansen (1995) indicated, the inflation rate in an RBC
model economy is negatively correlated with output, in contrast to what is observed
in U.S. time series; Second, RBC models with money cannot reproduce the so-called
liquidity effect, which suggests that an increase in money supply lowers both nominal
and real interest rates and raises the inflation rate, output and investment, at least
temporarily. According to Romer (1996), the conventional explanation of the liquidity
effect is that monetary expansions reduce the real interest rate. This is because an
increase in output requires a decline in the real interest rate. If the decline in the
real interest rate is large enough, it more than offsets the effect of the increase in
expected inflation. While many empirical studies including VAR literature support
this fact, RBC models with money imply the opposite, i.e., a rise in interest rates
and the inflation rate, and a fall in investment and output.
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Naturally, many economists tried to adopt frictions other than money into an
RBC model to capture monetary business cycle features. Two popular monetary
models are sticky price and limited participation models. Unfortunately, however,
it is said that those models adopting frictions other than money achieved only mild
success. As investigated in Christiano and Evans (1997), sticky price models fail to
produce a drop in the nominal interest rate following an expansionary monetary policy
shock. In contrast, limited participation models can generate the expected responses
to a monetary disturbance, but only under some implausible parameters. Moreover,
considering money neutrality in a long-term horizon and the fact that business cycle
data is measured in a long-term horizon, it can be argued that adopting frictions
other than money into an RBC model could be doubtful because those frictions could
matter only in a short-term horizon.
This paper examines the impact of technology and money shocks in a flexible-
price general equilibrium business cycle model with no frictions except money under
a cash-in-advance constraint and the assumption that the central bank follows an
interest rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993). In recent years, it has been widely
accepted that the so-called Taylor rule is a more realistic description of how the
Fed policy operates since the Fed definitely perceives the nominal interest rate as its
primary policy instrument. Particularly, a forward-looking interest rate rule has been
adopted based on Clarida and Gali (2000).
One thing significantly different from other researches on this topic is the way
the Taylor rule is introduced in the model. In this paper, the Taylor rule is introduced
by considering the relationship among the Fisher equation, Euler equation and the
Taylor rule in the dynamic system of the relevant RBC model. This approach can
be justified based on the reason that, if the Fed follows the Taylor rule strictly, and
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if we assume that the Fed always achieves its target nominal interest rate, then,
the nominal interest rate is determined prior to the real interest rate. Without the
Taylor rule, the real interest rate is determined by the Euler equation and the nominal
interest rate is subsequently determined by the Fisher equation. With this approach,
it has been shown that, even in a flexible-price environment, the two major failures
in RBC models with money can be resolved. Under the Taylor rule, the correlation
between output and inflation appears to be positive and the response of our model
economy to a shock is persistent. Furthermore, the possibility of an existing liquidity
effect is found.
There have not been many papers incorporating the Taylor rule in the context
of RBC modelling under a flexible-price environment. Among others, Dittmar et
al. (2003) and Chen (2003) tried similar approaches to this paper. Giving up the
cash-in-advance constraint, these two papers based on a shopping-time constraint
introducing money in their models. Dittmar et al. (2003) succeeded in showing
inflation persistence, but failed in showing a liquidity effect. Chen (2003) argued
that his result showed a persistent liquidity effect. However, when the Fed takes an
expansionary policy, his result shows a rise in the real interest rate and output and
a fall in the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate, i.e., correct movements in
output and the nominal interest rate but incorrect movements in the real interest rate
and the inflation rate.
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2. Model
2.1. Basic Structure
The dynamic general equilibrium framework of Walsh (2003), which is a modified
model of Cooley and Hansen (1989), is basically adopted in this paper. We consider
a closed economy model which is populated by a large number of identical agents.
The utility function of the representative agent is given as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, 1− ht) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−Φt
1− Φ +Ψ
(1− ht)1−ψ
1− ψ
]
, (3.1)
with 0 < β < 1. Here, ct is real consumption in period t, while ht is hours worked
in period t so that 1 − ht is equal to leisure time. The parameters Φ, Ψ and ψ
are restricted to be positive. The representative agent faces the cash-in-advance
constraint
ct ≤ Mt−1
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
≡ at, (3.2)
and the budget constraint
ct + kt + bt +mt ≤ yt + (1− δ)kt−1 +
(
1 + it−1
Πt
)
bt−1 + at, (3.3)
where Mt−1 is per capita currency carried over from period t − 1 to period t, Pt
is the price level in period t, Tt is per capita nominal lump-sum transfer equal to
(eµtMt−1 −Mt−1) where µt is the money growth rate in period t, mt = MtPt is the real
money balance in period t, kt−1 is per capita physical capital in period t determined
in period t− 1, Bt−1 is the agent’s holdings of nominal one-period bonds and bt−1 =
Bt−1/Pt, yt is per capita income in period t, it is the nominal interest rate in period
t, and Πt = 1 + pit is the gross inflation rate in period t − 1. Following Cooley and
Hansen (1995), we will only consider equilibria in which (3.2) and (3.3) hold with
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equality.
As mentioned above, per capita money holding, Mt, is assumed to grow at the
rate eµt − 1 in period t. That is,
Mt = e
µtMt−1, (3.4)
where µt is revealed at the beginning of period t. In order to specify the behavior
of the growth rate of the nominal money supply, µt, let ut be equal to the deviation
of money growth around the steady state, i.e., ut = µt − µ. Then, ut is assumed to
evolve according to
ut = ξ1ît + ξ2ŷt + ϕt, (3.5)
where ît = It − I˜, It = 1 + it is the gross nominal interest rate in period t, I˜ is the
steady state gross nominal interest rate, ŷt = ln yt − ln y˜, y˜ is the steady state per
capita income, ξ1 is the interest rate elasticity of real money balance demand, ξ2 is
the income elasticity of real money balance demand, and
ϕt = ηϕt−1 + ²t,
where the random variable ² is a white noise innovation with σ2² .
This is the first difference between Walsh (2003) and this paper. In Walsh (2003),
ut is assumed to evolve as
ut = ηut−1 + κzt−1 + νt, (3.6)
where 0 < η < 1 and 0 < κ < 1. The random variable ν is a white noise innovation
with variance σ2ν . This means that the real money balance is determined endogenously
in this paper while it is determined exogenously in Walsh (2003).
As will be clear when we discuss monetary policy, we need this change because
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we want to incorporate the Taylor rule explicitly in our model. By nature of an
interest rate targeting policy regime, the central bank does not care about changes
in aggregate money under an interest rate targeting policy regime. Note that this
feature is adequately captured in this setup. Although the central bank sets up a
money growth rate in advance, it does not have any desire to keep this pre-determined
money growth rate. If the economy deviates from a steady state, µt will be different
from µ until the economy gets back to a steady state so that the nominal interest
rate and per capita income may stay on the steady state path. Hence, as indicated in
Christiano and Rostagno (2001), money market equilibrium is purely determined by
money demand in this model.
The representative agent’s decision problem is characterized by the value function
V (kt−1, bt−1, at) = max
{
c1−Φt
1− Φ +Ψ
(1− ht)1−ψ
1− ψ + βEtV (kt, bt, at+1)
}
, (3.7)
where the maximization is with respect to {ct, ht, bt, kt,mt} and is subject to the
constraints (3.2) and (3.3).
The economy’s technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale
production function, expressed in per capita terms as
yt = e
ztkθt−1h
1−θ
t , (3.8)
where 0 < θ < 1. The technology shock, zt, consists of a single persistent component
that evolves according to the law of motion
zt = ρzt−1 + εt, (3.9)
where 0 < ρ < 1. The random variable ε is normally distributed with mean zero
and standard deviation σε. The portion of output that is not consumed is invested
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in physical capital as
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + xt, (3.10)
where δ is the depreciation rate with 0 < δ < 1 and xt is investment in period t.
The second difference between this paper and Walsh (2003) is that the central
bank follows the Taylor rule explicitly in this paper. Note that equation (3.6) implies
that the Fed in Walsh (2003) follows a monetary aggregate targeting policy. Specif-
ically, it is assumed that the Fed follows one of the two types of Taylor rule shown
below. The first rule is based on the seminal paper of Taylor (1993) such that
ît = ω1 (Etpit+1) + ω2 (ŷt) , (3.11)
where the parameter values of ω1 and ω2 are set as 1.5 and 0.5, respectively, and
Etpit+1 = Etpit+1 − pi where pit is the inflation rate in period t and pi is the steady
state inflation rate. The two monetary policy parameter values set up here are well
supported by empirical studies such as in Ball (1997). Hereafter, the model based on
the first policy rule is called Model 1.
The second rule is a modification of the first rule based on a Lucas-type aggregate
supply function of the form,
yt = y˜ + (pit+1 − Etpit+1),
which implies
ît = ω3(Etpit+1), (3.12)
where the value of parameter ω3 is set as 1.3, accordingly.
Notice that when the Lucas-type aggregate supply function holds, based on equa-
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tion (3.11), we have the following at the period (t− 1):
ît−1 = ω1 (pit) + ω2 (ŷt−1) ,
which can be expressed as
ît−1 = ω1 (pit − pi) + ω2 (pit − Et−1pit)
= ω1 (pit − pi) + ω2 (pit − it−1 + rt−1)
= (ω1 + ω2) pit − ω1pi − ω2it−1 + ω2rt−1
= (ω1 + ω2) pit − ω1pi − (ω2pi − ω2pi)− ω2it−1 + ω2rt−1
= (ω1 + ω2) pit − (ω1 + ω2)pi + ω2pi − ω2it−1 + ω2rt−1
= (ω1 + ω2) pit + ω2 (pi − it−1 + rt−1)
= (ω1 + ω2) pit + ω2
(
pi −
(
it−1 − i˜
)
− i˜+ (rt−1 − r˜) + r˜
)
= (ω1 + ω2) pit + ω2
((
pi − i˜+ r˜
)
− ît−1 + r̂t−1
)
= (ω1 + ω2) pit + ω2
(
−ît−1 + r̂t−1
)
.
Therefore, if we ignore ω2 (r̂t−1), then, we have
ît−1 =
(
ω1 + ω2
1 + ω2
)
pit.
By advancing one period ahead, we have
ît =
(
ω1 + ω2
1 + ω2
)
Etpit+1 ≈ 1.33 ∗ Etpit+1.
The policy rule in (3.12), hence, assumes that the Fed makes its monetary policy
decision fully taking the aggregate supply function into consideration. Suh (2004)
showed that, when a central bank follows an interest rate targeting policy in an
economy where the Lucas-type aggregate supply function and the Fisher equation
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hold, the optimal reaction function of the central bank is determined as the policy
rule in (3.12). Hereafter, the model based on the second policy rule is called Model
2.
2.2. Dynamic General Equilibrium System
The dynamic general equilibrium system consists of first-order conditions derived
from the optimization problem of a representative agent described in the previous
section, and other various related equations governing the evolvement of relevant
variables.
yt = e
ztkθt−1h
1−θ
t (3.13)
yt = ct + xt (3.14)
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + xt (3.15)
Rt = fk,t + 1− δ = θEtyt+1
kt
+ 1− δ (3.16)
λt = βEtRtλt+1 (3.17)
Ψ (1− ht)−ψ = (1− θ)
(
yt
ht
)
λt (3.18)
λt = βEt
(
1 + it
Πt+1
)
λt+1 (3.19)
λt = βEt
(
m−Φt+1
Πt+1
)
(3.20)
mt =
eµtmt−1
Πt
(3.21)
ct = mt (3.22)
Equations from (3.13) to (3.16) represent the production function, the resource
constraint, the investment evolvement equation, and the definition of marginal prod-
uct of capital. Equations from (3.17) to (3.20) represent the four first-order conditions
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derived from the utility maximization problem for the representative agent, which are
the Euler equation, the labor-leisure choice condition, the Fisher equation, and the
marginal utility of consumption, respectively. Equation (3.21) shows the evolvement
of the real money balance, and equation (3.22) is the cash-in-advance constraint.
Taking log-linearization on the above dynamic general equilibrium system, we
have the following log-linearized dynamic general equilibrium system. Note that we
have denoted ât = ln at − ln a˜, where a˜ is the steady state value, except ît = It − I˜,
r̂t = Rt − R˜, and pit = pit − pi, where Rt is the gross real interest rate and R˜ is
the steady state gross real interest rate. Therefore, ît, r̂t and pit are measured as a
percentage rate, and other variables are measured as a percentage deviation around
the steady state.
ŷt = θk̂t−1 + (1− θ)ĥt + zt (3.23)
0 =
y˜
k˜
ŷt − c˜
k˜
m̂t − δx̂t (3.24)(
y˜
k˜
)
ŷt =
(
c˜
k˜
)
m̂t + k̂t − (1− δ)k̂t−1 (3.25)
r̂t = θ
(
y˜
k˜
)(
Etŷt+1 − k̂t
)
(3.26)
λ̂t = Etλ̂t+1 + r̂t (3.27)
ŷt + λ̂t =
(
1 + ψ
h˜
1− h˜
)
ĥt (3.28)
λ̂t = ît − Etpit+1 + Etλ̂t+1 (3.29)
λ̂t = −Et
(
Φm̂t+1 + pit+1
)
(3.30)
m̂t = m̂t−1 + ξ1ît + ξ2ŷt − pit + ϕt (3.31)
ĉt = m̂t (3.32)
The above log-linearized dynamic general equilibrium system is exactly the same
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as in Walsh (2003), except equation (3.31), where the two elasticity terms are not
included. Note that, in Walsh’s (2003) model, we have ten endogenous variables (kt,
mt, yt, ct, xt, ht, λt, it, rt, pit) and two exogenous variables (zt and ϕt). This means
that the above ten equations derived based on necessary first-order conditions and
various related equations are good enough to solve this dynamic general equilibrium
system.
However, in order to achieve our main goal, we have to put either equation (3.11)
or (3.12) into the above log-linearized dynamic general equilibrium system. Since the
number of variables has to be equal to the number of equations, this means that
we have to eliminate one equation out of the system. In this paper, this task has
been done based on the relationship among the Taylor rule, the Fisher equation and
the Euler equation. Justification is based on the role of equation (3.27), which regu-
lates the evolvement of the real interest rate, and (3.29), which allows an interaction
among interest rates and the expected inflation rate, in the original model. Without
the Taylor rule, the gross real interest rate is determined by equation (3.27). The
inflation rate is determined by (3.30). So, the nominal interest rate is subsequently
determined by equation (3.29). However, if the Fed follows the Taylor rule strictly,
and if we assume that the Fed always achieves its target nominal interest rate, then,
the sequence for interest rate determination goes the opposite way. That is, the in-
flation rate is determined first by (3.29), and the nominal interest rate is determined
by either equation (3.11) or (3.12). Although the gross real interest rate is still deter-
mined by the equation (3.27) basically, it should interact with the inflation rate and
the nominal interest rate in the Fisher equation, subsequently.
Notice that there are many ways to eliminate one equation from the system
because we want to derive two equations out of three equations. Three different ma-
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nipulations have been tried and, as will be shown later, the third way of manipulations
has been adopted to study the dynamic properties of our models.
The first manipulation has been done as follows: Note that, in the case of Model
2, the Fisher equation (3.29) can be written as
0 = ît − ω3Etpit+1 + ω3Etpit+1 − Etpit+1 + Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t.
If the Fed always achieves its goal as below, then,
0 = ît − ω3Etpit+1, (3.33)
the below equation should be the case so that the Fisher equation holds
0 = (ω3 − 1)Etpit+1 + Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t.
Then, using the Euler equation (3.27), we can rewrite the above equation as
0 = (ω3 − 1)Etpit+1 − r̂t. (3.34)
Here, equation (3.34) is, in fact, a modified Fisher equation incorporating the Euler
equation. After all, we can replace equations (3.33) and (3.34) with equations (3.27)
and (3.29) in the system. Unfortunately, however, our model economies appear to
be too volatile under this manipulation. It turns out that the volatility comes from
the fact that we did, in effect, eliminate the Euler equation from the system. It is
understood that, since the Euler equation plays a key role in consumption-smoothing,
the first manipulation actually eliminates a smooth adjustment of the whole system
to a shock. This result implies that we need to keep the Euler equation as it is when
we study the dynamic properties of our models.
Secondly, the Fisher equation is simply replaced with the Taylor rule while
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keeping the Euler equation as it is. Under this manipulation, however, our model
economies appear to be divergent. This might be natural because, without the Fisher
equation, the gross real interest rate and nominal interest rate are determined sepa-
rately without interacting with each other. Note that, in this manipulation, the gross
real interest rate is determined only by equation (3.27) while the nominal interest
rate is determined only by either equation (3.11) or (3.12). This result implies that
we need to put the Taylor rule into the system while keeping the role of the Fisher
equation.
Therefore, the third manipulation has been done as follows: Note that, in the
case of Model 1, the Taylor rule can be written as
Etpit+1 =
1
ω1
ît − ω2
ω1
ŷt.
Putting the above equation into the Fisher equation, we have
0 = ît − Etpit+1 + Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t
= ît −
(
1
ω1
ît − ω2
ω1
ŷt
)
+ Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t.
Hence, finally, we have the following modified Fisher equation
0 =
(
ω1 − 1
ω1
)
ît +
ω2
ω1
ŷt + Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t. (3.35)
Note that, as far as the Fed strictly follows the Taylor rule and it always achieves its
target nominal interest rate, then, the above result should be the case. Also, note
that this manipulation does not affect any other variables in the system. In order to
study the dynamic properties, the original Fisher equation (3.29) has been replaced
with equation (3.35). As will be shown later, under this manipulation, our model
economies behave quite similar to what is observed in the U.S. data. From now on,
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we are going to investigate the dynamic properties of our model economies based on
this manipulation.
In solving the above dynamic general equilibrium system, we will apply the
solution method suggested by Uhlig (1999). A detailed procedure to apply the Uhlig
method is presented in the Appendix A (Log-linearization) and Appendix B (Solution
Method of Uhlig (1999)).
2.3. Calibration
The parameters used to study dynamic properties are listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Calibrated Parameters
Parameter θ δ β Φ ψ µ σε σ² ξ1 ξ2
Value .36 .019 .989 2 1 .015 .007 .0089 -.05 .5
The first five parameter values are based on Walsh (2003). The next three
parameter values are taken from Cooley and Hansen (1995). The two parameter
values on interest rate and income elasticity of real money balance came from Ball
(2001). These parameters imply the steady state values in Table 4.
Table 4. Steady State Values
Parameter R˜ y˜/k˜ c˜/k˜ h˜/k˜ I˜ Π˜
Value 1.011 0.084 0.065 0.021 1.026 1.015
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3. Simulation Results
Simulations have been done under three different situations: technology shocks
with exogenous money, technology shocks with endogenous money, and money shocks
with endogenous money. The simulation results are to be compared with the U.S.
data based on Cooley and Hansen (1995), and the simulation results of Walsh (2003)
and Cooley and Hansen (1995), which are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Comparison of Simulation Results When ρ = .95
Data CH (1995) Walsh (2003)
s.d. Corr. s.d. Corr. s.d. Corr.
Output 1.72 1.00 1.69 1.00 1.033 1.00
Consumption 0.86 .77 0.42 .85 0.385 .97
Hours 1.59 .86 1.35 .99 0.221 .86
Investment 8.24 .91 5.83 .99 3.286 1.00
Inflation 0.57 .34 0.26 -.58 0.902 -.14
Real Rate - - - - 0.014 .85
Nominal Rate 0.66 .10 0.39 -.02 0.006 .83
The first simulation is just done to highlight the difference in results between
when the real money balance is determined exogenously and when it is determined
endogenously. As will be shown later, since our model economies behave similar to
what is observed in the U.S. data with endogenous money, the third simulation with
money shocks is done only with endogenous money. The two first simulations have
been taken with ρ = .95. The simulation under money shocks with endogenous money
has been done with η = .50 following Cooley and Hansen (1995) and Walsh (2003).
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3.1. Technology Shocks with Exogenous Money
We begin our simulations with technology shocks assuming the real money bal-
ance is determined exogenously. Technically, this means that we use the following
equation rather than (3.31)
m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit + ϕt.
Other features of our models remain unchanged. The simulation results of our models
are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Simulation with Technology Shocks and Exogenous Money
Model 1 Model 2
s.d. Corr. s.d. Corr.
Output 1.0302 1.00 1.0302 1.00
Consumption 0.3821 0.97 0.3821 0.97
Hours 0.2173 0.86 0.2173 0.86
Investment 3.2828 1.00 3.2828 1.00
Inflation 0.2743 -0.46 0.2743 -0.46
Real Rate 0.0142 0.85 0.0142 0.85
Nominal Rate 0.9943 -1.00 0.0615 0.85
Regarding these results, there are two points we need to note. First, both sim-
ulation results are quite similar to that in Walsh (2003). However, in the case of
Model 1, the correlation between the nominal interest rate and output appears to
be negative. Another thing is that the standard deviation of the nominal interest
rate is substantially increased in both cases compared to Walsh (2003) although the
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standard deviation of almost all variables appear to be less than what we observe in
the U.S. data.
Second, in the case of Model 2, the fluctuation of the nominal interest rate is
bigger than that of the real interest rate, while both of them are smaller than in U.S.
data. Furthermore, the magnitude of correlation value in the nominal interest rate
is the same as in the real interest rate. In the case of model 1, we do not have this
result. These are, in fact, well expected from the beginning. Note that, in the case
of Model 2, equation (3.35) is expressed as
0 =
(
ω3 − 1
ω3
)
ît + Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t,
which is equal to the below equation considering equation (3.27)
0 =
(
ω3 − 1
ω3
)
ît − r̂t. (3.36)
By this equation, the relationship between the nominal interest rate and the real
interest rate is tightly linked. Note that the Taylor rule is behind this tight linkage.
Since the expected inflation rate in the Taylor rule is determined prior to interest
rates, the magnitude of correlation value in both interest rates should be the same.
Also, note that, in the case of model 2, we set up the parameter value of ω3 as 1.3.
This brings two effects: First, when the expected inflation rate varies, the nominal
interest rate fluctuates more than the real interest rate; Second, the sign of correlation
value in both interest rates should be the same. Note that, in the case of Model 2, if
we had set up the parameter value of ω3 less than unity, the two interest rates could
not have had the same sign in terms of correlation with output.
Impulse responses are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As we saw in Table 6,
impulse responses of all variables except the nominal interest rate are the same in
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses to Technology Shocks in Model 1 with Exogenous Money
both cases. One notable thing is that the impulse responses are quite persistent. This
result is, in fact, also similar to that in Walsh (2003).
3.2. Technology Shocks with Endogenous Money
Next, assuming the real money balance is determined endogenously, a simulation
with technology shocks has been done. Table 7 shows the simulation results.
Regarding these results, the most important thing is that the correlation between
inflation and output appears to be positive in both cases. Furthermore, in the case of
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to Technology Shocks in Model 2 with Exogenous Money
70
Table 7. Simulation with Technology Shocks and Endogenous Money
Model 1 Model 2
s.d. Corr. s.d. Corr.
Output 0.9345 1.00 0.9423 1.00
Consumption 0.2083 0.90 0.2224 0.91
Hours 0.1254 0.29 0.1290 0.38
Investment 3.4922 1.00 3.4725 1.00
Inflation 0.4542 0.97 0.4114 0.95
Real Rate 0.0121 0.75 0.0123 0.76
Nominal Rate 0.9074 -1.00 0.0533 0.76
Model 2, all correlation terms appear to be positive like the U.S. data. It turns out
that this result comes from the fact that we assumed an endogenous money process
in our model.
Technically, this result of positive correlation between inflation and output can
be understood in two ways. First, note that, from equations (3.30) and (3.31), we
have
λ̂t = −Et
(
Φm̂t+1 + pit+1
)
= −ΦEt
(
m̂t + ξ1ît+1 + ξ2ŷt+1 + ϕt+1
)
− (1− Φ)Et (pit+1) .
Any variation in the expected future real money balance holding will bring an ad-
justment to the expected inflation rate. Also, note that we assumed the parameter
value of Φ to be 2. Hence, given λ̂t, as far as Et (ξ2ŷt+1) is positive after a technology
shock, Et (pit+1) should be positive as well, i.e., we should have a positive correlation
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between expected output (or future real money balance holding) and the expected
inflation rate in period (t+ 1). Second, note that, in Walsh (2003), the evolvement
of the real money balance is assumed to be
m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit + ϕt, (3.37)
and, in our models,
m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit + ξ1ît + ξ2ŷt + ϕt. (3.38)
Note that, considering ĉt = m̂t, in Walsh (2003), there should be a negative correlation
between consumption and inflation in period t. Hence, whenever consumption (or
production) increases, the inflation rate decreases, and vice versa. This means that,
as far as the correlation between output and consumption is positive, there is a
negative correlation between output and inflation in the current period. However, in
our models, the correlation between output and inflation (or output and consumption)
has to be positive after a technology shock in period t. That is, if output increases
after a technology shock, then, inflation and consumption should increase as well.
Economic intuition of this finding has a significant meaning in the literature.
According to Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991), higher inflation increases the demand
for leisure because inflation represents a tax on the purchases of goods. One effect
of inflation, then, is to reduce the supply of labor. This then reduces output, con-
sumption, investment, and the steady state capital stock. Therefore, in Walsh (2003),
we need a decrease in inflation in order to have an increase in labor supply (hours
worked) and, thus, output and consumption.
However, in our models, labor supply increases after a technology shock although
inflation increases as well. This result came from the fact that the technology shock
brought an increase in labor productivity. Even if the representative agent under-
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stands that he needs to pay some inflation tax, he is still willing to increase labor
supply if he can increase his consumption due to increased productivity. In other
words, although there does exist the partial negative correlation between inflation
and labor supply (and, thus, between inflation and output) as Cooley and Hansen
(1989, 1991) indicated, if the positive correlation between consumption (or output)
and labor supply is large enough, then, the overall resulting correlation between con-
sumption (or output) and inflation could appear to be positive. In fact, the simulation
results in our models imply that the positive effect of increased output on consump-
tion offsets enough the negative effect of increased inflation on consumption, resulting
in a positive correlation between consumption (or output) and inflation.
There is one more thing we need to note: the correlation values of the nominal
interest rate, the real interest rate and the inflation rate are bigger than in the U.S.
data while the correlation value of hours worked is smaller. This might imply that
the speed of price adjustment in our model economies is much faster than in the
real economy. If the speed of price adjustment were significantly slow in our model
economies, i.e., the correlation value of the inflation rate were lower than what we
saw in Table 7, then, the correlation values of the nominal interest rate and the real
interest rate might also be lower, which could lead a higher correlation value of hours
worked.
Impulse responses are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. One thing we need to
note is that the impulse response of hours worked in both cases shows that hours
worked quickly decreases after the shock. This would imply the negative effect of
increased inflation discussed above. However, it turns out that the response of hours
worked clearly depends on the degree of persistence in the technology shocks. In
fact, under ρ = .90, the impulse response of hours worked significantly shifts up so
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Figure 3. Impulse Responses to Technology Shocks in Model 1 with Endogenous
Money
that the variable goes down slightly below the steady state one and a half years later
after the shock occurred, while the impulse responses of other variables remain almost
unchanged compared to when ρ = .95.
3.3. Money Shocks with Endogenous Money
Here, a simulation with money shocks and with endogenous money is done.
Money shocks are given to our model economies in the form of changing the money
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Figure 4. Impulse Responses to Technology Shocks in Model 2 with Endogenous
Money
growth rate as shown in equation (3.31). In this simulation, the key point lies on
whether our model can reproduce the so-called liquidity effect rather than matching
the U.S. business cycle data.
Note that, although the Fed strictly follows the Taylor rule, a monetary policy
shock is given in our models in the form of changing the money growth rate, not in the
form of changing the nominal interest rate directly. This is based on the assumption
that the Fed needs to change the nominal money supply if it wants to change the
nominal interest rate. While addressing the price-level indeterminacy problem which
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is often noted as a potential problem with an interest rate targeting policy, McCallum
(1986) indicated that the nominal money supply is the actual instrument to control
the nominal interest rate. Also note that, in this set-up, if the Fed wants to boost
the economy, the Fed injects some nominal money into the economy while keeping
the Taylor rule strictly1.
Impulse responses are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Since Model 2 generates
a better result, the simulation has been done only based on Model 2. The responses
suggest the possibility of an existing liquidity effect. All variables of inflation, invest-
ment, real and nominal interest rates show correct movements as the liquidity effect
would suggest.
In Walsh (2003), the nominal interest rate goes up rather than down after money
shocks. It is argued that the main effect of money shocks is to increase the expected
inflation rate and raise the nominal interest rate because prices have been assumed
to be perfectly flexible. However, Model 2 which is also under a perfectly flexible-
1This behavior of the Fed does not contradict. For example, Suh (2004) showed
that, if aggregate output is given by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function, if the
Fisher equation holds, and if the Fed’s objective is to minimize the following Barro-
Gordon type loss function at every period t, where a > 0 and b > 0,
min
it
Lt = a [pit(it)− pi]2 + b [yt − y˜]2 ,
then, the optimal reaction function of the Fed is expressed as the following modified
Taylor rule, where ω > 0,
ît = ω(pit).
This means that the Taylor rule is determined in the process of minimizing the given
loss function. Hence, the Fed will need no monetary shocks if both pit and yt stay
near the steady state. Only if pit or yt deviates from the steady state, the Fed needs
to change the nominal interest rate to affect pit or yt. Therefore, in this sense, a
monetary policy shock, which is done through increasing (or decreasing) the nominal
money supply to change the nominal interest rate, will be needed if and only if the
Taylor rule requires that the Fed do it. In other words, a monetary policy shock, an
increase (or decrease) in the nominal money supply, is done to get the Taylor rule
held on, but not to defy the Taylor rule.
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Figure 5. Impulse Responses to Money Shocks in Model 2 (I)
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price environment shows a different result. It turns out that this result comes from
incorporating the Taylor rule into our model. Note that, by incorporating the Taylor
rule, we have equation (3.36) rewritten below
0 =
(
ω3 − 1
ω3
)
ît − r̂t. (3.39)
Without the Taylor rule, we would have the original form of the Fisher equation as
0 = ît − Etpit+1 − r̂t. (3.40)
Under equation (3.40), when the expected inflation rate changes after money shocks,
the resulting correlation between the nominal interest rate and real interest rate can be
either positive or negative depending on the interaction among those three variables.
However, under equation (3.39), the correlation between the nominal interest rate and
real interest rate should be positive whatever happens in the expected inflation rate.
Notice that the real interest rate is basically determined by the Euler equation, prior
to the nominal interest rate. Therefore, whenever the real interest rate decreases, the
nominal interest rate will also decrease as shown in Figure 6, resulting in a different
movement in the nominal interest rate compared to Walsh (2003).
Output and, thus, consumption show, however, incorrect movements. This can
be understood by the argument of Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991), i.e., higher
inflation increases the demand for leisure because inflation represents a tax on the
purchases of goods. Note that, when there is a technology shock resulting in an
increase in productivity, there is a possibility that hours worked will increase if the
positive effect of increased output offsets enough the negative effect of the increased
inflation rate, as we saw in Figure 3 and Figure 4. However, when there is a money
shock without any increases in productivity, there can be only negative effect of
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increased inflation under rational expectations. Therefore, as Cooley and Hansen
(1989, 1991), this will decrease hours worked and, thus, output shown in Figure 6.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the effect of a technology shock and a money shock
incorporating the Taylor rule as the Fed’s monetary policy. One thing significantly
different from other researches on this topic is the way the Taylor rule is introduced
in the model. In this paper, the Taylor rule is introduced by considering the rela-
tionship among the Fisher equation, Euler equation and the Taylor rule explicitly in
the dynamic system of the relevant RBC model. With this approach, it has been
shown that, even in a flexible-price environment, the correlation between output and
inflation can be positive, and the existence of the liquidity effect is possible.
There have not been many papers incorporating the Taylor rule in the context
of RBC modelling under a flexible-price environment. Among others, Dittmar et al.
(2003) and Chen (2003) tried similar approaches to this paper. Dittmar et al. (2003)
succeeded in showing inflation persistence, but failed in showing the liquidity effect.
Chen (2003), after an expansionary monetary policy, showed a rise in the real interest
rate and output and a fall in the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate, i.e.,
correct movements in output and the nominal interest rate but incorrect movements
in the real interest rate and the inflation rate.
The difference in simulation results among this paper, Dittmar et al. (2003) and
Chen (2003) might result from three reasons. First, Dittmar et al. (2003) and Chen
(2003) used different set-ups of the Taylor rule from this paper. Chen (2003), based
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on his own estimation, used different coefficients of ω1 and ω2 as follows:
ît = 0.4904 ∗ (Etpit+1) + 0.2435 ∗ (ŷt) .
Dittmar et al. (2003) assumed that the Fed targets the period (t+ 1) nominal interest
rate based on the realized inflation rate and output in period t as the following set-up
shows:
ît+1 = 1.5 ∗ (pit) + 0.125 ∗ (ŷt) .
Second, as noted earlier, in this paper, the Taylor rule is introduced by considering the
relationship among the Fisher equation, Euler equation and the Taylor rule explicitly.
Dittmar et al. (2003) and Chen (2003) did not look at this relationship in setting up
their dynamic models. Third, there is a theoretical difference in analyzing the effect
of a monetary policy shock. Chen (2003) gives a monetary policy shock to his model
in a different way such that the Fed can change the nominal interest rate directly
without any prior changes in the real money balance. Dittmar et al. (2003) do not
show detailed simulation results of a monetary policy shock while noting that their
model does not produce the liquidity effect. Besides, the model of Chen (2003) has a
more complicated structure than that of this paper because the model of Chen (2003)
includes the government fiscal policy explicitly.
Although our models achieved a mild success in resolving the two problems in
RBC models, it does have some limitations as well. Among other things, our models
could not produce a correct movement in output when there is a money shock. Also,
the standard deviation of almost all variables appear to be less than what we observe
in the U.S. data. However, these limitations suggest a future research direction. Note
that our models have worked on a very strict environment where the cash-in-advance
constraint, the Taylor rule and the Fisher equation are tightly linked to each other.
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Therefore, while keeping the basic approach focusing on the relationship between the
Euler equation and the Fisher equation, incorporating some other ways modelling a
monetary economy, like the shopping time approach, could produce a better result.
Similarly, seeking a way by which we can get the tight relationship between the real
and nominal interest rates a little loosened, for example, introducing some mechanism
which breaks down the Taylor rule and Fisher equation temporarily, could also be a
good research topic.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY
In this dissertation, two questions concerning monetary policy under the Taylor
rule have been addressed. In Chapter I, the question is on, under the Taylor rule,
whether a central bank should be responsible for both bank supervision and monetary
policy. In Chapter II, the question is on whether the Taylor rule plays an important
role in explaining modern business cycles in the United States.
The first chapter begins with the observation that, as Peek et al. (1999) shows,
there is a systematic error in making monetary policy if the central bank does not
have any bank supervisory role. Based on this observation, this chapter investigates
why there should be a systematic error in making monetary policy. This task has been
addressed using a simple game-theoretic approach. In this approach, the most critical
assumption is that there is a asymmetric information about state of the economy
between the central bank and commercial bank.
The implications of the first chapter can be summarized as follows: (i) it is
inevitable for the central bank to have a systematic error in conducting monetary
policy when the central bank does not have a bank supervisory role; (ii) without a
bank supervisory role, the effectiveness of monetary policy cannot be guaranteed; (iii)
because of the existence of conflict of interests, giving a bank supervisory role to the
central bank does not guarantee the effectiveness of monetary policy, either; (iv) the
way of setting up another government agency, bank regulator, and making the central
bank and the regulator cooperate each other does not guarantee the effectiveness of
monetary policy because, in this way, the systematic error in conducting monetary
policy cannot be eliminated; (v) in the view of social welfare, not in the view of
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effectiveness of monetary policy, it is better for the central bank to keep the whole
responsibility or at least a partial responsibility on bank supervision.
These implications have significant meaning on the current trend surrounding
central banking systems around the world. Many countries have been considering
whether bank supervisory responsibilities are an important function for the central
bank or are better assigned to a separate government agency. The results in the first
chapter indicate that the current trend surrounding central banking systems around
the world is not on the right track. These implications may be even more important
in many other countries, particularly developing countries, since, in these countries,
the credit markets are usually bank-centered, and the banking industry structures
are often far from perfect competition. Lack of competition in the banking industry
will strengthen the market power of commercial banks, and, under this situation, if
the central bank does not have any bank supervisory role, a selfish profit maximizing
behavior of commercial banks could significantly lower the effectiveness of monetary
policy.
In the second chapter, we examined the effect of a technology shock and a money
shock in the context of an RBC model incorporating the Taylor rule as the Fed’s
monetary policy. One thing significantly different from other researches on this topic
is the way the Taylor rule is introduced in the model. In this chapter, the Taylor
rule is introduced by considering the relationship among the Fisher equation, the
Euler equation and the Taylor rule explicitly in the dynamic system of the relevant
RBC model. This approach can be justified based on the reason that, if the Fed
follows the Taylor rule strictly, and if we assume that the Fed always achieves its
target nominal interest rate, then, the nominal interest rate is determined prior to
the real interest rate. Without the Taylor rule, the real interest rate is determined by
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the Euler equation and the nominal interest rate is subsequently determined by the
Fisher equation.
With this approach, it has been shown that, even in a flexible-price environment,
the two major failures in RBC models with money can be resolved. Under the Taylor
rule, the correlation between output and inflation appears to be positive and the
response of our model economy to a shock is persistent. Furthermore, the possibility
of an existing liquidity effect is found. These results imply that the Taylor rule does
play a key role in explaining business cycles in the United States.
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APPENDIX A
LOG-LINEARIZATION
Non-stochastic Balanced Growth Path
Note that, in our production function, yt = e
ztkθt−1h
1−θ
t , there is no term repre-
senting permanent technological variations, which is usually restricted to be in labor
productivity, i.e., we have no labor-augmenting technology term. Hence, in a steady
state, all real variables should show no growth. Since variations in zt is assumed to
be temporary, we can ignore it for our investigation of steady state growth.
Hence, we have
• From (3.18),
Ψ
(
1− h˜
)−ψ
= (1− θ)
(
y˜
k˜
)(
k˜
h˜
)
λ˜
Hence, by (A.2) and (A.5),
(
1− h˜
)−ψ (
h˜
)Φ
=
(
β
Π˜
)(
1− θ
Ψ
)(
y˜
k˜
)Φ−θ
1−θ
(
c˜
k˜
)−Φ
(A.1)
• From (3.20),
λ˜ = β
(
c˜−Φ
Π˜
)
(A.2)
• From (3.17),
λ˜ = βR˜λ˜
Hence, we have
R˜ = f˜k + 1− δ = 1
β
(A.3)
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• From (3.16) and (A.3),
R˜ = θ
y˜
k˜
+ 1− δ
Hence,
y˜
k˜
=
1
θ
(
R˜− 1 + δ
)
(A.4)
• From (3.13),
y˜ = k˜θh˜1−θ
Therefore, we have
h˜
k˜
=
(
y˜
k˜
) 1
1−θ
(A.5)
• From (3.15),
k˜ = (1− δ)k˜ + x˜
Therefore, we have
x˜
k˜
= δ (A.6)
• From (3.22),
c˜ = m˜ (A.7)
• From (3.14),
y˜ = c˜+ x˜
Therefore, by (A.6), we have
c˜
k˜
=
y˜
k˜
− δ (A.8)
• From (3.21),
m˜ =
eµm˜
Π˜
Therefore,
Π˜ = eµ (A.9)
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Log-linearization
Denoting ât = ln at− ln a˜, and defining ît = It− I˜, r̂t = Rt−R˜ and pit = Πt−Π˜ =
pit − pi, we have
• Log-linearization of (3.20):
λt = βEt
(
m−Φt+1
Πt+1
)
Hence, 
λt = βEt
(
m−Φt+1
Πt+1
)
λt = βEt
(
m−Φt+1
1+pit+1
)
λ˜
(
1 + λ̂t
)
= βEt
(
m˜−Φ
Π˜
)(
1−Φm̂t+1
1+pit+1
)
(
1 + λ̂t
)
≈ Et
(
1− Φm̂t+1 − pit+1
)

Therefore, approximately, we have
λ̂t = −Et
(
Φm̂t+1 + pit+1
)
(A.10)
• Log-linearization of (3.18):
Ψ (1− ht)−ψ = (1− θ)
(
yt
ht
)
λt
Defining lt = 1− ht, we have
Ψl−ψt = (1− θ)
(
yt
1− lt
)
λt
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Noting that l˜
(
1 + l̂t
)
= 1− h˜
(
1 + ĥt
)
, hence, l̂t = −
(
h˜
l˜
)
ĥt, we have
Ψl˜−ψ
(
1− ψl̂t
)
= (1− θ)
(
y˜λ˜
1−l˜
)(
1+ŷt
1+ĥt
)(
1 + λ̂t
)
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
l˜
)
ĥt
)
=
(
1+ŷt
1+ĥt
)(
1 + λ̂t
)
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
l˜
)
ĥt
)
=
(
1 + ŷt − ĥt + λ̂t
)
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
l˜
))
ĥt = ŷt + λ̂t

Hence, we have (
1 + ψ
(
h˜
1− h˜
))
ĥt = ŷt + λ̂t (A.11)
• Log-linearization of (3.17):
λt = βEtRtλt+1
λ˜
(
1 + λ̂t
)
= βR˜λ˜Et (1 + rt)
(
1 + λ̂t+1
)
(
1 + λ̂t
)
≈ Et
(
1 + r̂t + λ̂t+1
)

Hence,
λ̂t = r̂t + Etλ̂t+1 (A.12)
• Log-linearization of (3.19):
λt = βEt
(
1+it
Πt+1
)
λt+1
λt = βEt
(
1+it
1+pit+1
)
λt+1
λ˜
(
1 + λ̂t
)
= βEt
(
I˜
Π˜
)(
1+it
1+pit+1
)
λ˜
(
1 + λ̂t+1
)
(
1 + λ̂t
)
= Et
(
1+it
1+pit+1
)(
1 + λ̂t+1
)
(
1 + λ̂t
)
≈ Et
(
1 + ît − pit+1 + λ̂t+1
)

Hence,
λ̂t = ît − Etpit+1 + Etλ̂t+1 (A.13)
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• Log-linearization of (3.16): Rt = θEtyt+1kt + 1− δ
Rt = θ
(
y˜
k˜
)(
1+Etŷt+1
1+k̂t
)
+ 1− δ

Therefore,
r̂t = θ
(
y˜
k˜
)(
Etŷt+1 − k̂t
)
(A.14)
In order to apply the Uhlig method, we need to eliminate expectations from
equation (A.14). Using (A.11) and (A.16) to eliminate ĥt between them, we
obtain an expression for ŷt such that
ŷt =
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
))(
θk̂t−1 + zt
)
+ (1− θ) λ̂t
θ + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
)
Advancing this one period, taking expectations, and using (A.12) and (3.9), we
have
Etŷt+1 =
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
))(
θk̂t + ρzt
)
+ (1− θ)
(
λ̂t − r̂t
)
θ + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
)
So, (A.14) can be expressed as
r̂t = θ
(
y˜
k˜
)
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
))(
θk̂t + ρzt
)
+ (1− θ)
(
λ̂t − r̂t
)
θ + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
) − k̂t

Finally, we have
r̂t = θ
(
y˜
k˜
)(θ − 1)ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
)
k̂t +
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
))
ρzt + (1− θ) λ̂t(
θ + ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
))
+ θ (1− θ)
(
y˜
k˜
)
 (A.15)
• Log-linearization of (3.13): yt = eztkθt−1h1−θt
log yt = zt + θ log kt−1 + (1− θ) log ht

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Noting log y˜ = z˜ + θ log k˜ + (1− θ) log h˜ and z˜ = 0, we have
ŷ = zt + θk̂t−1 + (1− θ)ĥt
Hence,
ŷt = zt + θk̂t−1 + (1− θ)ĥt (A.16)
• Log-linearization of (3.15): kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + xt
k˜ek̂t = (1− δ)k˜ek̂t−1 + x˜ex̂t

Using the property that ex ≈ (1 + x), we have
k˜ + k˜k̂t = (1− δ)k˜ + (1− δ)k˜k̂t−1 + x˜+ x˜x̂t
k˜k̂t = (1− δ)k˜k̂t−1 + x˜x̂t
k̂t = (1− δ)k̂t−1 + x˜k˜ x̂t

Hence, by (A.6), we have
k̂t = (1− δ)k̂t−1 + δx̂t (A.17)
• Log-linearization of (3.22): ct = mt
c˜(1 + ĉt) = m˜(1 + m̂t)

Hence,
ĉt = m̂t (A.18)
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• Log-linearization of (3.14): yt = ct + xt
y˜(1 + ŷt) = c˜(1 + ĉt) + x˜(1 + x̂t)

Hence, from (A.18) and (A.6), we have
y˜
k˜
ŷt =
c˜
k˜
m̂t + δx̂t (A.19)
• Log-linearization of (3.21):
mt =
eµtmt−1
Πt
= (1+µt)mt−1
(1+pit)
m˜(1 + m̂t) =
eµ(1+ut)m˜(1+m̂t−1)
Π˜(1+pit)
(1 + m̂t) ≈ (1 + ut + m̂t−1 − pit)

where ut = µt − µ. Hence, approximately, we have
m̂t = m̂t−1 + ut − pit (A.20)
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APPENDIX B
SOLUTION METHOD OF UHLIG (1999)
• In order to apply the solution method of Uhlig (1999), first, we need to classify
all variables in three groups:
– Exogenous variables (e.g. zt and ϕt). We call zt the vector of exogenous
variables, k × 1, that show up in the model at time t.
– State variables (e.g. kt and mt). We call the vector of state variables xt,
m× 1.
– Endogenous variables (e.g. yt, ct, ht, λt, it, rt, pit, xt). We call the vector
of endogenous variables yt, n× 1.
• Second, rewrite the log-linearized model as
0 = Axt +Bxt−1 + Cyt +Dzt
0 = Et[Fxt+1 +Gxt +Hxt−1 + Jyt+1 +Kyt + Lzt+1 +Mzt]
zt+1 = Nzt + ²t+1; Et(²t+1) = 0
Some matrices must meet the following conditions:
1. Matrix C has to be of size (l×n), where l ≥ n. Here l denotes the number
of deterministic equations included in the first equation above.
2. Matrix C must be of rank n.
3. Matrix F must be of size (m+ n− l)×m.
4. Matrix N have stable eigenvalues, only.
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• In our exercise, therefore, we have
A =

1 c˜
k˜
0 0
0 1
0 1
0 0
θ
(
y˜
k˜
)
ψ
(
h˜
1−h˜
)
0
0 0
1 0

B =

δ − 1 0
θ 0
0 −1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
δ − 1 1

C =

−
(
y˜
k˜
)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 1− θ 0 0 0 0 0
−ξ2 0 0 0 −ξ1 0 1 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 AA 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 BB 0 CC 0 0
ω2
ω1
0 0 0 ω1−1
ω1
−1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −δ

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D′ =
 0 1 0 0 0 −θ
(
y˜
k˜
)
ρ 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0

F =
 0 0
0 Φ

G =
 0 0
0 0

H =
 0 0
0 0

J =
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

K =
 0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

L =
 0 0
0 0
 , M =
 0 0
0 0
 , N =
 ρ 0
0 η

where
AA = −
(
1 + ψ
(
h˜
1− h˜
))
BB = −θ(1− θ)
(
y˜
k˜
)
CC = θ + ψ
(
h˜
1− h˜
)
+ θ(1− θ)
(
y˜
k˜
)
102
• A solution is matrices P , Q, R and S such that xt+1 = Pxt +Qzt
yt = Rxt + Szt

and such that x and y do not explode.
• A detailed procedure to get P , Q, R and S is provided by Uhlig (1999).
• However, more helpfully, Uhlig has written a Matlab code that will compute
the solution for us. All we have to do is to provide it with the vectors x and
y, and the matrices A, B, ... , N . The Matlab program can be downloaded at
http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wpol/html/toolkit.htm.
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